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Every day, we are challenged with decisions, big and small, rational and irrational, that
are made in our personal lives, workplaces, schools and beyond. Some of them are
strong and self-confident, others need support and guidance. Some are perceived to
be more pleasant in the very moment, but might not consider our best interest in the
future. All of them, however, have one thing in common: the impact they create, short
or long-term, individual or collective. This thesis analyzes the individuals’ decision-
making and the role of institutions in creating incentives and influencing individuals’
choices.
Although the decision-making happens on a daily basis, it still represents one of the
most complex cognitive processes of human performance. It involves more than just
synthesizing and applying all the information and experiences that individuals might
have accumulated throughout their life span. Individual characteristics and prefer-
ences, as well as the environment, in which the decision maker is behaving, also have a
considerable impact on the process itself and the corresponding outcome.
The research on decision-making is, in fact, an integral part of many fields of study
and thus methodologically different. However, in all of them the research was hampered
for years by the standard assumptions of rationality, self-interest and perfect informa-
tion. It took quite a while to pick up on this issue and empirically show that these
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assumptions still hold in some situations, but not in general. Especially decisions with
long-term consequences are hard to make and are often based only on short-time con-
siderations. Also behavioral biases such as self-control problems or inertia often lead to
bounded rationality where individuals fail to act in their own best interests, thus open-
ing up space for interventions and strengthening the role of public policy. Hence, on the
one hand, individuals influence public policy and institutions through their preferences
and choices. On the other hand, public policy and institutions provide a framework
of rights and wrongs within which individuals act and interact with each other, shape
their expectations and limit their choices. So above all, this thesis is about incentives
and the role of institutions that create them.
This thesis is divided into two major parts. The first part is descriptive and theo-
retical and deeply rooted in behavioral public economics. It aims at understanding how
people make decisions and the factors that affect their decision-making process. The
second part provides an empirical analysis of higher education and is at the heart of
research in economics of education. It focuses on the interaction between individuals’
characteristics and choices that determine their performance within a given institutional
framework, namely university. Both parts are relatively independent and consider in-
dividuals in different roles and situations. The following paragraphs provide a brief
summary of the remaining chapters contributing to this thesis.
Chapter 2 consists of a short essay that provides a critical discussion on the valid-
ity of the neoclassical rationality paradigm as a normative standard. Furthermore, it
addresses the alternative, behavioral approach to bounded irrationality and discusses
the need and importance of paternalistic interventions.
Chapter 3 examines individuals’ behavior regarding healthy good consumption by
conducting a theoretical analysis of government’s intervention in the decision-making
of individuals with self-control problems. It investigates the effectiveness of a partic-
ular paternalistic intervention, namely subsidies for health care, aimed at changing
consumption behavior of present-biased individuals, who underestimate the effect of
today’s consumption on future health. Such preference for immediate gratification al-
lows paternalistic policymakers to indirectly regulate behavior by exploiting the time-
inconsistency of individuals.
2
In order to analyze this effect, immediate subsidies paid for health-conscious con-
sumption are compared to the future subsidies rewarding a good health outcome. The
main finding of this chapter is that, while both policies can implement the first-best
choice, doing so by future subsidies results in higher costs for the government. This
arises since the individual anticipates that, from today’s perspective, she will make
biased use of future subsidies. Hence, in order to create the same incentive effect, a
future subsidy must be higher in present value terms.
Chapter 4 presents an econometric analysis of the determinants of students’ aca-
demic performance at university. It is based on a unique administrative data set on
more than 12,000 student careers. The obtained microanalysis confirms previous find-
ings from the literature on higher education, that the high school grade is a strong
predictor of the students’ academic success, measured both as the graduation probabil-
ity and as the final university grade. The socio-economic variables have, in contrast, a
relatively small impact.
When looking at the different faculties separately, the link between high school
performance and university success is shown to vary substantially, suggesting differences
in the teaching and examination cultures. At some faculties, for instance, social sciences
or humanities, the probability of graduating is rather low, while grades are quite good
conditional on high school performance. At others, like economic sciences or forest
sciences, weaker students have a greater chance of graduating, but grades are more
differentiated. However, at faculties like mathematics and physics, weaker students
have neither a good chance of graduating nor of obtaining a good grade.
Chapter 5 analyzes professors’ effect from a fundamental first-year course in Eco-
nomics on students’ later performance in follow-on courses. It focuses on the differences
in grading policies between five different professors assigned to the same mandatory
course. The econometric analysis is based on an extensive dataset consisting of ad-
ministrative data on more than 2,900 students from the University of Göttingen. By
applying an instrumental variable (IV) strategy, special attention is given to the prob-
lem of self-selection bias of students toward certain professors.
The obtained results indicate that professors have powerful effects on students’
achievement: Besides huge differences in grading policies, we find a significant effect of
3
having a certain professor in the mandatory first-year course on students’ later perfor-
mance. However, the sign of this effect is ambiguous, and depends on the mathematical
rigor of the course and the examination style.1
When talking about decisions, ultimately, it is up to the reader to decide whether
or not this thesis is valuable and thus worth reading. For me it was definitely worth
writing.
1The summaries of Chapters 3-5 heavily borrow from the abstracts of the discussion paper ver-





“Bounded rationality is not irrationality. ... On
the contrary, I think there is plenty of evidence
that people are generally quite rational; that is,
they usually have reasons for what they do.”
— (Simon, 1985)
“Dividing our field into behavioral and
neoclassical economics is akin to distinguishing
time separable economists from others.”
— (Chetty, 2015)
The standard economic theory of consumer behavior builds on the assumption that
individuals act consistently and rationally so as to maximize a unique, well-defined, ob-
jective function. Over the last decades, the validity of this view has been strongly chal-
lenged by the empirical evidence from laboratory experiments in social sciences. Hence,
people often make decisions that are not in their best interest, ranging from postpon-
ing the unpleasant to chasing the immediate satisfaction of wants. Even economists
increasingly raise doubts about the rationality of the individual actions, supporting the
need to provide a more suitable framework for capturing individuals’ systematic devi-
ations from the standard economics rules of decision-making. Bounds on rationality
seem to be important often enough to include them in economic analysis, and that is
how the advocates of paternalism come into play.
Indeed, many behavioral researchers have already abandoned the notion of individ-
uals as fully rational and suggested a more complex picture in which individuals do not
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exhibit rational expectations but instead a dynamic inconsistency (Thaler, 1981), use
heuristics (Gabaix et al., 2006) and are subject to preference reversals due to framing
effects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Although the research field of behavioral economics has grown rapidly, its validity
as an alternative approach to the neoclassical model is still a matter of debate (List,
2004; Levitt and List, 2007; DellaVigna, 2009). The main questions raised are, on the
one side, whether individuals are indeed plagued by systematic biases and errors, and
on the other side, whether the authorities have the right to steer individuals’ choices in
the right direction.
Moreover, there is no agreement among behavioral researchers on the criteria for
what would count as true preferences and how paternalistic decision-makers know what
is best for us. Some researchers also question putting the blame for societal problems
solely on the individuals’ mind, thus ignoring the effect of industries nudging unhealthy
behavior. A further important question is whether individuals can learn to deal with
risk and uncertainty, such that educating people can be considered a more sustainable
alternative to nudging.
As one can notice from the above, the existing theoretical literature provides neither
a clear measure of irrationality nor formulates common criteria for the justification of
paternalistic interventions. Instead, it presents multiple approaches often with widely
convoluted and self-contradictory arguments. This paper aims at addressing these and
related concerns by discussing different arguments and different lines of evidence in the
paternalism-debate presented by some behavioral researchers.
We begin with probably the most famous anomaly hunter among economists -
Richard Thaler, who unveiled his idea of paternalism in the paper co-authored with
Cass Sunstein (Conlisk, 1996). Thaler and Sunstein (2003) argue in favor of liber-
tarian paternalism and believe that the anti-paternalistic stance of many economists
is based on false assumption and some misconceptions. The false assumption is that
individuals know their best interests better than the third parties that try to impose
paternalism on them. The two misconceptions mentioned in their paper relate to the
claims that, firstly, paternalism always involves coercion, and, secondly, that there are
viable alternatives to paternalism. The authors classify a policy as paternalistic if it
6
aims at influencing individuals’ choices in order to make the individuals better off, with
better off as an objective measure and not necessarily an equal sign between revealed
preferences and welfare. For this reason, researchers should concentrate on identifying
the most effective paternalistic options, rather than on raising the question of whether
paternalistic policies should be implemented or not.
Assuming such a self-evident role and function of paternalistic policy-makers does
not fully convince me. Let me make my concerns more concrete. The presumption that
paternalism should interfere with individuals’ freedom is usually based on the assump-
tion that individuals do not know what is best for themselves. Hence, paternalism, no
matter in which form, requires benevolent experts who are time-consistent and know
what is best for us in order to be able to improve our decision making. Nevertheless,
this requirement appears to be self-contradictory: On the one hand, the benevolent ex-
perts suffer from the same cognitive biases as other individuals; on the other hand, they
are supposed to steer people towards more preferable behaviors. Policy-makers like all
individuals often make the best decision given the situation. Therefore, unsurprisingly,
opponents of paternalism commonly argue that paternalistic interventions may cause
harm by interfering with individuals’ autonomy by producing consequences that are
not always in individuals’ best interest.
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) give many examples of paternalistic interventions in
their paper. One of them is the automatic enrollment in 401(k) employee saving plans.
In most of the existing saving plans, employees have to actively opt-in to join the plan,
such that the default is no enrollment. However, in the preferable case of automatic en-
rollment, employees are enrolled in the plan unless they actively opt-out - a paternalistic
intervention introduced to promote employees’ welfare. Another possible alternative for
the enrollment decision would be to require the employees to make a choice, either to
opt-in or opt-out.
Even though this alternative is not seriously considered by the authors, since em-
ployees are prone to procrastination and plagued by inertia and therefore should not
be forced to make a choice, I cannot fully agree with this argument. The adoption
of automatic enrollment should be considered paternalistic, because “most employees
would prefer to join the saving plan if they took time to think about it and did not lose
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the enrollment form”. If this is true, why should then someone take the active choice
away from the employees? If refraining from taking any action would not be an option,
would the employees, according to the above argument, make a worse choice than in
the paternalistic case?
Furthermore, I am not convinced with the argument, that in the case of automatic
enrollment, since no one is forced to do anything, such intervention should not be
considered unobjectionable. If an individual is automatically enrolled in a saving plan,
she is committed to give up a certain amount of money, unless she opts-out. As a result
of such commitment, an employee might be then forced to rethink other choices in her
life, because the money left does not allow her to maintain the previous standard of
living. Is this kind of forcing less problematic?
According to the authors’ guess in the case of automatic enrollment, most employees
stay in the plan eventually, and only very few opt out. Thus, cost-benefit analysis would
appear to favor the selection of this default option, since the cost of insufficient savings
for retirement should be greater than the cost of excessive savings. As I mentioned,
however, the paternalism should make some people better off, without making others
worse off. What if someone is willing to opt-out but simply forgets to do so? Would
this be an example of a parallel to losing the enrollment form? Why are the costs of
someone who forgot to opt-in higher than of someone who forgot to opt-out? Therefore,
I am not convinced that paternalism becomes, not only permissible, but also generally
unavoidable to correct for the status quo bias of individuals.
Gigerenzer (2015) also partly disagrees with Thaler’s and Sunstein’s attitude to-
ward the justification of paternalism. He concludes in his paper that the claim that
individuals are hardly educable lacks evidence and that teaching individuals to become
more aware of their choices offers a true alternative to nudging. In his opinion lib-
ertarian paternalism forgoes using incentives and enforcing behavior in favor of tricks
called nudges to steer people’s choices. Hence, libertarian stands for freedom of choices
and paternalism for the paternal protection from ourselves, from our systematic biases
and errors. Gigerenzer (2015) does not criticize nudging per se, but the justification of
nudges on the basis of a latent irrationality by libertarian paternalists such as Thaler
and Sunstein. His criticism is twofold: Firstly, libertarian paternalism should not focus
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on the individuals’ mind as the real cause of societal problems and use nudging as an
excuse for not protecting consumers. Secondly, the suggestion that releasing individuals
from their biases through education is nearly impossible, is a bias itself and therefore
should be reconsidered in light of experimental evidence that even children can become
risk savvy and that less-educated people tend to have worse health outcomes. Libertar-
ian paternalism turns out to be even more severe than some forms of hard paternalism,
since its justification of governmental interventions is based not only on struggles with
achieving goals but also on problems with setting goals worth to achieve.
I certainly agree with the author, that educating people offers a more sustainable
solution than nudging. At the same time I can think of many reasons for politicians
to prefer nudging over educating people. Nudging comes with governmental and in-
dustrial profits and it is a cost-saving alternative to educating people. Nudging does
not aim at understanding but very often at achieving a certain goal such as increasing
participation rates or changing lifestyles. Last but not least, low-educated people are
more obedient, do not question things and are easier to manipulate than educated in-
dividuals. Nudging individuals into proper behaviors has a chance to succeed only if,
at the same time, industries stop nudging people into the opposite direction, namely
unhealthy behaviors. Nonetheless, educating people to risk-savvy consumers is still the
most promising solution.
As already noticed by Simon (1985), the fact that people are bounded when making
decisions, however, does not mean that they are irrational, and I strongly endorse this
view. Bounded rationality, unlike irrationality, is not based on inconsistent preferences
but rather on a goal-oriented behavior, which implies the presence of intention. The
intended rational behavior, that is making decisions with the intent of reaching some
short-term other long-term goals, is, however, constrained by the uncertainty of environ-
mental courses of action and by the limited computational and information-processing
capacities of human beings, and thus inherently bounded. According to Simon (1947),
individuals reduce the complexity of the decision-making process to a simplified indi-
vidual model that consists only of a limited number of factors and alternatives. Subse-
quently they choose the most satisfactory rather than the most optimal option, where
satisfactory itself may refer to reasonable, adequate or acceptable. In other words,
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individuals make good enough decisions given the situation. Because the first satisfac-
tory alternative is selected, the decision-making process is strongly driven by the order
in which alternatives are presented and by the effort of the involved decision-maker.
Therefore, Simon (1947) labeled such decision-making behavior as satisficing.
Regarding the future of behavioral economics, Conlisk (1996) and Chetty (2015)
suggested that the research on bounded rationality should not be seen as a “departure
from economic reasoning, but a needed extension of it”, which I more than agree with.
It neither should be considered as a separate sub-field and a challenge to neoclassical
economic model but rather as a natural progression of it. Therefore, instead of dis-
cussing the validity of the traditional rationality assumption, we should incorporate
behavioral factors into regular policy by: (1) using new policy tools in order to steer
individuals’ behavior in a certain direction, (2) improving empirical predictions about
the effects of existing policies on individual’s behavior, (3) accounting for the impact
of differences between decision and experienced utilities and related new welfare impli-
cations. Such a pragmatic rather than philosophical approach to behavioral economics
may be more useful than framing the debate around the assumptions about the ratio-
nality/irrationality of individuals. A universal assumption of appropriate rationality is




Behavior Now or Later*
3.1 Introduction
Life consists of three cycles – past, present and future. We regret our past, fully
appreciate the present pleasures and very often refuse to move forward. Sometimes
there is not even an inch of movement, and although we consistently plan to direct our
behavior towards the future, currently the most immediate moment still gets the highest
weight. This so-called present-bias is reflected in the popular saying – Eat, drink and
be merry, for tomorrow we diet. According to that saying, people either underestimate
the effect of today’s consumption on future health or postpone health investments to
a later date, since unpleasant activities seem to be even more unpleasant the closer
they are to the present. As a consequence, a well-meaning paternalistic government
may intervene to counterbalance the intertemporal distortion of consumption toward
the present and hence improve the health status.
In this paper we analyze a specific instrument for this intervention, health-related
subsidies. These can be designed in two different ways, depending on the timing and
the target of the subsidy. They can either immediately reward an individual’s health-
conscious consumption, or reward the individual’s health outcome in the future. We
show that this distinction is relevant both for the determination of the optimal subsidy
rate and for the subsidy’s effectiveness, measured by the tax revenues required to over-
come the present-bias. This is due to the fact that an immediate and a future subsidy
are paid to different ‘selves’ of the individual.
Apart from subsidies, taxes on unhealthy behavior, so-called ‘sin taxes’, come to
*This chapter originates from joint work with Robert Schwager (see Danilowicz-Gösele and Schwa-
ger, 2016).
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mind as an alternative instrument to overcome present-biased behavior. Indeed, from
a public finance point of view, taxes may appear as the superior instrument since they
have the obvious advantage of raising revenues. Consequently, research on paternalistic
interventions has so far mostly concentrated on taxes. Nevertheless, subsidies are also
widespread, as the examples below illustrate. The reason for this fact may be that
rewarding (with subsidies) has more positive connotation than punishing (with taxes):
giving instead of taking away. In particular, a government which would create incentives
for healthy consumption by taxing the sick would be considered nasty and inhuman,
even if the individuals themselves have triggered the illness by their own behavior.
For these reasons, we study health-related subsidies. We begin, in Section 3.2, with
some examples of immediate and future health subsidies, followed by a brief review
of the literature related to paternalistic policies. Our analysis is based on a model,
presented in Section 3.3, of an infinite-horizon consumer choice problem with two goods
per period. In addition to a numeraire good, there is a healthy good that creates positive
health consequences in the future in addition to current utility from consumption.
Present-bias is modeled in the form of quasi-hyperbolic discounting as in Harris and
Laibson (2001).
We consider a government which treats such short-time desire as an error and hence
intervenes to correct the individual’s choices. In Section 3.4, we analyze an immediate
subsidy paid for health-conscious consumption in the same period and a future subsidy
rewarding a good health outcome one period later. For both forms of subsidy, we char-
acterize the rate which, despite present-biased preferences, induces the consumption
pattern which an unbiased individual would choose. While the optimal rate of imme-
diate subsidy simply bridges the gap between the biased and the unbiased evaluation
of health benefits, the future subsidy must take into account two behavioral responses
of the individual which are specific to present-biased preferences. On the one hand,
future transfer income, just like future health, is valued less by the individual – the
discounting effect of the future subsidy. On the other hand, the individual can change
the behavior of her future self by increasing future income – the instrumental effect of
the future subsidy.
In a next step, in Section 3.5, we investigate how the balance of these effects de-
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termines the present value of taxes required to finance the optimal subsidy. From the
point of view of a paternalistic decision maker, who discounts future payments in an
unbiased fashion, the immediate subsidy entails lower cost since the discounting effect
dominates. This result suggests that policies of the second kind, where the reward is
delayed, are less effective in the presence of present-biased preferences than policies of
the first kind, where health conscious behavior is subsidized immediately.
Finally, in Section 3.6, we abandon the assumption of a paternalistic government,
and instead consider a government which represents the individual. This government
follows the same present-biased preferences as the consumer, but has the same fiscal
instruments at its disposal as the paternalistic government. We show that such a
government implements the optimal subsidy only if it puts sufficiently high weight on
future payoffs. Otherwise, the gain from committing future selves to increased healthy
consumption does not outweigh the immediate loss from forcing an unwanted change in
behavior upon one’s own current self. Furthermore, since a present-biased government
discounts future tax payments more heavily, the cost of future subsidies counts for less in
its evaluation of present values than in the computation of a paternalistic government.
Therefore, in contrast to the paternalistic government, the government which represents
the consumer will in some cases favor the future over the immediate subsidy scheme. We
conclude in Section 3.7 by summarizing our findings and suggesting possible extensions
of our analysis.
3.2 Examples and Literature
An example for an immediate subsidy is provided by a new nutrition program, Healthy
Incentives Pilot (HIP), developed by the United States Department of Agriculture,
which has been tested for 12 months in Hampden County (Massachusetts).3 HIP is
an incentive-based program to empower low-income people, Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) recipients, to consume more fruits and vegetables. For
every dollar spent with the SNAP Electronic Benefit Transfer cards on fruit and veg-
etables, participants earned an incentive of 30 cents. The incentive was immediately
added to their SNAP account, thus cutting the costs for fruit and vegetables by almost
3See Bartlett et al. (2014).
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one third. According to the final report, HIP participants increased their consumption
of targeted fruits and vegetables by 26%, driving the Healthy Eating Index by 5%.
The self-reported total spending on fruits and vegetables of HIP households was 8.5%
higher than spending reported by non-HIP households, and stayed stable across the
pilot period.
Another example is the School Fruit Scheme (SFS), an EU-wide voluntary program
designated to encourage young people to consume more fruit and vegetables.4 Accord-
ing to the final report, in 2010/11 SFS reached 8,146,290 children in 54,267 schools
(European Commission, 2012). The program thus proved successful in increasing the
fruit and vegetables consumption of children in the short-run. Further examples for
immediate subsidies are financial rewards for abandoning unhealthy behaviors (Volpp
et al., 2008, 2009) and pricing and promotion strategies related to healthy items (French
et al., 2001).
There are also examples for programs where the reward is given after a certain
period of time. In the United States, many companies offer Healthy Rewards Cards
and other rebate programs as an incentive to promote healthy lifestyles. Participants
of health reward programs earn points and gift cards for engaging in healthy behav-
iors such as quitting tobacco (IBM: ”Healthy Living Rebate” program), participating
in disease management programs (FedEx: diabetes-management program; IBM: child-
hood obesity management program ”Children’s Health Rebate”), taking the general
health assessments or exercising regularly (Scotts Miracle-Gro: ”Health Quotient” and
”Wellness Center”).5
Also in Germany future subsidies in form of bonus programs offered by statutory
health insurance companies are a part of modern life. Finally, an example for a sub-
sidy on future health outcomes is provided by the widespread use, in health insurance
contracts, of rebates granted to clients who do not claim any expenses during some pe-
riod. These examples show that health-related subsidies are a widely used and effective
policy instrument.
In public finance research, present-biased preferences and paternalistic policies to
4Participating Member States are in addition required to implement strategies including educational
and awareness-raising initiatives.
5See Business Roundtable (2007).
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improve individual decision making have received increasing attention. O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2003, 2006) study optimal sin taxes in an economy with heterogeneity
in preferences for the sin good and in the degree of time-inconsistency. They show
that when there is some degree of self-control problems in the population such taxes
not only counteract overconsumption by consumers with self-control problems, but can
even create Pareto improvements.
A similar problem has been addressed by Aronsson and Thunström (2008), who
consider the policy implications related to unhealthy food consumption in an economy
with time-inconsistent individuals. Their result shows that a combination of subsidies
for wealth and health capital makes the individual choose the same resource allocation
as the social planner, thus internalizing the externality imposed by the individual’s
current self on her future selves.
Cremer et al. (2012) study the interaction between sin goods and health spending
within two settings. In the first one, an individual is subject to persistent error and
hence continues making biased choices. In the second one, an individual is modeled as
a dual self, meaning that she later acknowledges the mistakes made by her previous
biased self. Cremer et al. (2012) show that the first-best optimum can be decentralized
by individualized taxes and subsidies. In the first setting, sin goods should be taxed
and health-care expenditures subsidized. In the second, there is no need for subsidizing
health-care expenditures, but a subsidy on saving is desirable.
Self-control problems related to smoking have been studied by Gruber and Kőszegi
(2001). These authors extend the model of Becker and Murphy (1988), where consumers
are “rational addicts”, by introducing time-inconsistent preferences. According to their
results, individuals decrease their cigarette consumption already when future increases
in tobacco taxes have been legislatively enacted but are not yet effective. This strongly
refers to forward-looking behavior in consumption decisions. Moreover, the authors
find that in the presence of time-inconsistency the optimal tax on cigarettes should not
only depend on externalities, but also on the internal costs of smoking. Thus, excise
taxes on cigarettes have a self-control function that is of high value to smokers who
suffer from lack of commitment. In Gruber and Kőszegi (2004), the authors introduce
a self-control adjustment to standard tax incidence measures. This firstly lowers the
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overall incidence of tobacco taxes and secondly reduces their regressivity.
A systematic review from recent U.S. studies on the effectiveness of food and bev-
erage taxes and subsides in improving public health was done by Powell et al. (2013).
These studies analyze the relationship between prices/taxes on the demand for sugar-
sweetened beverages, fast-food, fruits and vegetables and on body weight outcomes.
Soda taxes imposed on sugar-sweetened beverages, with mean price elasticity of −1.21,
do not seem to have much impact on weight. On the contrary, reducing prices for
fruits and vegetables, with price elasticity of demand of about −0.5, was found to be
associated with lower weight outcomes. As the authors emphasize, this shows the ef-
fectiveness of subsidizing fruits and vegetables consumption. Hence, this review proves
that relative price changes induced by taxes and subsidies have a significant impact on
weight outcomes through consumption patterns.
However, not only governments, researchers and companies pay more attention to
health outcomes and health-related interventions. Also the general public would sup-
port reducing health insurance taxes for individuals with healthy habits such as exercise
and abstention from smoking, as shown by a cross-sectional telephone survey in Israel
done by Brezis and Marans (2010). Support for a policy of differential taxation accord-
ing to lifestyle was high across all sectors of society, even among smokers.
From all this we may conclude that, firstly, paternalistic instruments to promote
long-term changes in an individual’s behavior are welcomed by different social groups
and, secondly, subsidies related to health-conscious behavior can improve health out-
comes. By studying such subsidies, our paper adds to previous research which has put
more emphasis on taxes. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, the timing of
subsidies which is at the heart of our approach has not yet been analyzed.
We now turn to presenting the model which we use to address this issue.
3.3 The Model
An individual consists of a sequence of autonomous temporal selves, which are indexed
by the corresponding periods, t = 0, 1, 2, ... . In each period t, a self with the exogenous
and constant per-period income y and the cash-on-hand xt, which may differ from
income because of taxes and subsidies, consumes a healthy good ct and a numeraire
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good dt. We assume throughout that individuals cannot borrow or save.
6 We will
restrict our attention to steady state equilibria where choices and state variables are
constant over time.
Normalizing current commodity prices to 1, in the absence of government interven-
tion, self t’s budget constraint is given by xt = y = ct + dt. Her instantaneous utility in
period t is
ut ≡ w(ct) + v(dt) + ht, (3.1)
where w(ct) and v(dt) denote a self’s period-t utility from consumption of healthy good
and the numeraire, respectively. The function ht = h(ct−1) represents the positive
health consequences from past healthy good consumption, with h0 ≥ 0 as the indi-
vidual’s initial (previous) health status. For this function, we use the normalization
h(0) = 0.
We assume that v′(dt) > 0, w
′(ct) > 0 and w
′′(ct) ≤ 0, v′′(dt) ≤ 0, so that there are
positive and weakly decreasing marginal benefits of consumption. Similarly, consump-
tion of the healthy good has positive but non-increasing marginal benefit for health,
h′(ct−1) > 0 and h
′′(ct−1) ≤ 0. To rule out corner solutions, we assume that at least
one of the two second derivatives w′′ or v′′ is strictly negative. Moreover, we impose
w′(0) + δh′(0) > v′(y) and w′(y) + δh′(y) < v′(0), where δ ∈ (0, 1) represents time-
consistent discounting.
Following Laibson (1994, 1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), we adopt (β, δ)-
preferences in our model. A self’s intertemporal preferences at time t are thus given
by




where β ∈ (0, 1] measures the bias for the present. Within this preference structure we
can distinguish two cases: for β = 1, the preferences are time-consistent and reduced
to exponential discounting, and for β < 1, the preferences are present-biased and the
discount rates decline over time.
6This paper does not aim at analyzing the interaction of savings with diverse paternalistic policies.
Several papers have already demonstrated that hyperbolic consumers save less than exponential con-
sumers (Laibson, 1997, 1998; Angeletos et al., 2001; Diamond and Kőszegi, 2003). This result is also
expected in our framework.
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Since a time-inconsistent individual consists of multiple selves, she is not able to
commit to a particular future consumption behavior. Every self has a tendency to
pursue immediate gratification in a way that their future selves do not appreciate. She
will therefore choose a consumption level (ct, dt) that maximizes her current utility ut
plus a biased version of future utilities, as in (3.2), and not the individual’s long-run
utility as expressed by U when β = 1.
We begin our analysis by solving, as a reference case, the individual’s optimization
for β = 1, where there is no need for government intervention. In this case, in each
period t, a self with cash-on-hand xt chooses consumption ct and dt. In the absence of
taxes or subsidies, the first state variable xt is given exogenously and evolves according
to the equation xt+1 = y. The second state variable ht is influenced by the past healthy
good consumption and evolves according to the equation ht+1 = h(ct).
The unbiased choice is derived from the value function
V (ht, xt) = max
ct,dt
{w(ct) + v(dt) + ht + δV (ht+1, xt+1)|xt − ct − dt = 0}. (3.3)
Denoting optimal choices as functions of cash-in-hand by c(xt) and d(xt), one finds after







= v′(d(xt)) = λt, (3.4)
where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint. From the
envelope theorem, one has ∂V (ht+1, xt+1)/∂ht+1 = 1. Using this in (3.4) shows that,
for any time-constant exogenous per-period income xt = y, the optimal solution of the
above optimization problem c∗ = c∗(y) and d∗ = d∗(y) is stationary and given by the
simultaneous solution to the budget constraint c∗ + d∗ = y and
w′(c∗) + δh′(c∗) = v′(d∗) . (3.5)
Notice that from the assumptions on w′′, v′′ and h′′ and the boundary assumptions on
w′ + δh′ and v′, this solution is unique and satisfies 0 < c∗(y), d∗(y) < y. Intuitively, in
the absence of present-biased preferences, marginal utilities of the numeraire and the
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healthy good are equalized, with the latter consisting of the immediate marginal benefit
of consumption and of the delayed marginal impact on health.
3.4 Corrective Policy
We now consider the case where the individual has present-biased preferences. In
the following Subsections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we analyze two measures to counterbalance
the intertemporal distortion of consumption toward the present: an immediate subsidy
related to health investment, and a future subsidy related to health outcome. Subsection
3.4.3 illustrates the results by means of two examples.
3.4.1 Immediate Subsidy
Suppose that the government introduces a per unit subsidy z̃t on the individual’s healthy
good consumption ct. To finance the subsidy payments, the government imposes a
lump-sum tax τ̃t. Thus, cash-in-hand is xt = y − τ̃t, and the price for the healthy
commodity is reduced to 1 − z̃t. The binding budget constraint is then given by xt =
(1 − z̃t)ct + dt or equivalently by y = ct + dt + τ̃t − z̃tct. The state variable xt evolves
according to the equation xt+1 = y − τ̃t+1. The state variable ht depends on the past
healthy good consumption, so that it evolves according to ht+1 = h(ct). This is similar
to the reference case, with the difference that consumption ct is now influenced by the
subsidy z̃t.
At time t, the current self t uses the discount factor βδ and her current-value function
can be written as
W (ht, xt) = max
ct,dt
{w(ct) + v(dt) + ht + βδV (ht+1, xt+1)|xt − (1− z̃t)ct − dt = 0} .




















Using ∂V (ht+1, xt+1)/∂ht+1 = 1, substituting c
∗ = c∗(y) for c(xt) and d
∗ = d∗(y) for
d(xt) and rearranging, we get




With this subsidy rate, the unbiased choices satisfy the first-order condition (3.6) of
every self t. When in addition, a lump sum tax is levied which covers subsidy pay-
ments, these choices also satisfy the budget constraint in every period. Par Rewriting
the subsidy rate z̃ with the help of (3.5), we summarize this result in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. The government can induce first-best consumption ct = c
∗(y) and
dt = d





per unit of healthy consumption financed by lump-sum taxes τ̃t = τ̃ = z̃c
∗(y) in all
periods t = 0, 1, 2, ....
For β = 1, the numerator in (3.7) is zero so that there is no need for subsidizing
health-conscious consumption. For β < 1, the numerator gives the present value of the
undervaluation of the marginal health benefit. The denominator is the marginal utility
of income, so that the fraction z̃ describes by how much the marginal willingness to
pay for the healthy good differs between the unbiased and the biased consumer. Thus,




Now we examine the second form of subsidies, namely, future subsidies rewarding good
health outcomes. Suppose, therefore, that the government grants a subsidy zt on ht
and imposes a lump-sum tax τt in order to finance the subsidy payments. Cash in
hand is then given by xt = y − τt + ztht, and the binding budget constraint is given by
xt = ct + dt or y = ct + dt + τt − ztht. In the case of future subsidies the state variable
xt evolves according to the equation of motion xt+1 = y+ zt+1ht+1− τt+1 and the state
variable ht according to the equation ht+1 = h(ct).
The maximization problem of the present self t is given by the current-value function
W (ht, xt) = max
ct,dt
{w(ct) + v(dt) + ht + βδV (ht+1, xt+1)|xt − ct − dt = 0}, (3.8)
where V (ht+1, xt+1) is the continuation value function as in (3.3). The optimal choices
solving this problem are again denoted by c(xt) and d(xt). In the Appendix 3.A.I it is
shown that these functions satisfy the Euler equation
v′(d(xt)) = w
′(c(xt)) + βδh
′(c(xt)) + {v′(d(xt+1))− (1− β) [w′(c(xt+1)) · c′(xt+1)
+v′(d(xt+1)) · d′(xt+1)]} δzt+1h′(c(xt)).
(3.9)
For given subsidy rate zt+1, a solution to this equation consists of a choice function
c(xt) and its derivative c
′(xt+1). From the budget constraint, these two values then
determine d(xt) and d
′(xt+1). As there are still two free variables c(xt) and c
′(xt+1),
there are multiple solutions to the Euler equation, even if one restricts attention to
steady states.7 This arises since the decision of self t depends on her expectation of self
t+ 1’s reaction to an increase in income c′(xt+1). However, since this increase does not
occur in equilibrium, the expectation is not determined in the model.8
In our analysis, we focus on a particularly appealing equilibrium, namely the one
7This is a common feature of models with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and infinite time horizon.
See e.g. Karp (2005), p. 269-271.
8In contrast, when the subsidy is paid immediately as in Proposition 1, self t’s choice does not affect
self t + 1’s behavior, and hence her behavior is uniquely determined.
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where the first-best choice function c∗(y) and its derivative c∗′(y) solve the Euler equa-
tion in every period, that is c(xt) = c
∗(y) and c′(xt+1) = c
∗′(y) for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... To
find the subsidy rate which achieves this, solving (3.9) for zt+1 yields
zt+1 =
v′(d(xt))− w′(c(xt))− βδh′(c(xt))
δh′(c(xt)){v′(d(xt+1))− (1− β)[w′(c(xt+1)) · c′(xt+1) + v′(d(xt+1)) · d′(xt+1)]}
.
By substitution of c∗ = c∗(y), d∗ = d∗(y), c∗′(y), and d∗′(y) from the stationary first-
best solution given in (3.5), and observing that xt+1 = y if the government runs a
balanced budget, we arrive at the following result:




v′(d∗)− (1− β)[w′(c∗)c∗′(y) + v′(d∗)d∗′(y)]
(3.10)
and imposes taxes τ0 = 0 and τt = τ = zh(c
∗) in all subsequent periods t = 1, 2, ..., the
first-best behavior ct = c
∗(y), dt = d
∗(y) in all t = 0, 1, 2, ... is an equilibrium despite
present-biased preferences.
To interpret the rate z in (3.10), note first that for β = 1 the numerator is zero and
there is no need for subsidizing health-conscious consumption. For β < 1, we multiply




v′(d∗)− (1− β)[w′(c∗)c∗′(y) + v′(d∗)d∗′(y)]
}
= δ(1− β)h′(c∗). (3.11)
The right-hand-side of (3.11) equals, as in (3.7), the marginal benefit of healthy con-
sumption which self t does not take into account because of her present bias. Consid-
ering the left-hand-side of (3.11), we observe first that increasing healthy consumption
by one unit in period t increases the subsidy in period t+ 1 by zh′(c∗) units. Moreover,
the curly bracket is β∂V (ht+1, xt+1)/∂xt+1, evaluated at first-best values.
9 Multiplied
by δ, this is the utility gain accruing to self t if the income of self t+ 1 is raised by one
unit. Altogether, the left-hand-side of (3.11) describes the additional utility that self
9See equation (A.5) in the Appendix 3.A.I.
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t acquires through the subsidy if she increases healthy consumption by one unit. The
optimal rate z is set such that this subsidy-induced utility gain equals the bias in the
evaluation of future health benefit, thereby correcting for the bias.
Comparing (3.10) to the optimal subsidy rate in case of immediate subsidization
in (3.7), one first notices the discount factor δ and the marginal health impact of
consumption h′(c∗) in the numerator of (3.7). These differences reflect the facts that the
immediate subsidy is paid one period earlier and based on consumption of the healthy
good rather than on health outcome. Moreover, both forms of subsidy differ because
of two other, less obvious, effects which are generated by present-biased behavior.
The first effect, which we label as discounting effect, arises because self t, who takes
the decision on healthy consumption, evaluates period t+1 income differently from self
t + 1, who receives the subsidy. Since for self t, this additional income accrues in the
future, she disregards the fraction 1− β of the benefits procured by marginal spending
on both goods. Formally, this is expressed by the fact that in the denominator of (3.10)
the term (1− β)[w′(c∗) · c∗′(y) + v′(d∗) · d∗′(y)] is subtracted from the marginal utility
of income. This effect raises the optimal future subsidy rate z compared to the optimal
current rate z̃.
The second effect, which we label as instrumental effect, occurs since the future
subsidy allows self t to shift self t+ 1’s spending in a way self t appreciates. From self
t’s perspective, there should be no additional discounting of health benefit from period
t+2 to period t+1. Since self t+1 takes her decision subject to such a bias, the current
self anticipates that the future self spends less on healthy consumption than what the
current self considers optimal.
To see that the future subsidy provides an instrument for self t to correct this bias,
use (3.5) in the denominator of (3.10) and observe that c∗′(y)+d∗′(y) = 1. The optimal
future subsidy rate can then be written as
z =
1− β
βv′(d∗) + (1− β)δh′(c∗)c∗′(y)
. (3.12)
If the marginal propensity to consume the healthy good c∗′(y) is zero, then the denom-
inator of (3.12) reduces to βv′(d∗), self t’s evaluation of self t + 1’s marginal utility of
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income. However, when some of the additional income is spent on the healthy good
(c∗′(y) > 0), self t values an additional unit of subsidy higher than βv′(d∗). From self
t’s perspective, the health benefit in period t + 2 is undervalued by self t + 1, and
hence self t welcomes any additional spending on the healthy good. Consequently, the
optimal subsidy rate decreases in the marginal propensity to consume the healthy good
c∗′(y). Compared to the immediate rate z̃, this effect tends to reduce the optimal future
subsidy rate z.
The importance of the income effect is illustrated by means of two special cases, to
which we now turn.
3.4.3 Special Cases
The cases we consider are characterized by quasi-linear preferences regarding consump-
tion goods c and d respectively. To focus on the shape of utility functions w and v, we
assume that h(c) = c in both cases.
In the first special case, the numeraire enters utility linearly, so that v(d) = d,
whereas the healthy good has decreasing marginal utility, w′′(c) < 0. Then c∗′(y) = 0
and d∗′(y) = 1, and the optimal subsidy rates from (3.7) and (3.10) are z̃ = δ(1 − β)
and z = (1− β)/β, implying z̃ = δβz. As explained above, the optimal future subsidy
rate reflects both the current self’s biased valuation of future income (the discounting
effect) and her benefit from changing the future self’s behavior (the instrumental effect).
In this special case, where no part of additional income is spent on the healthy good,
only the discounting effect is present. Therefore, the ratio of the current to the future
subsidy rate simply reflects the current self’s discounting of future income.
The second special case is given by a utility function where the healthy good enters
linearly, while numeraire d has decreasing marginal utility, v′′(d) < 0. In order to make
both cases comparable, we again fix the total marginal utility of the linear good to unity,
implying, with h(c) = c, that w(c) = (1− δ)c. Then c∗′(y) = 1 and d∗′(y) = 0 and the
optimal subsidy rates from (3.7) and (3.10) are z̃ = δ(1−β) and z = (1−β)/[β+δ(1−β)],
yielding z̃ = z[δβ+δ2(1−β)]. Hence, in this case, the ratio of current to future subsidy
rate is larger.
To explain this, we first observe that the immediate subsidy rates are the same
24
regardless of whether the preferences are linear in the healthy good or in the numeraire.
Considering future subsidy rates, one notices that the term δ(1−β), which describes the
disregarded health effect in the future, appears only in the case when the healthy good
enters utility linearly. In this case, the additional income procured by the future subsidy
will be entirely used for consumption of the healthy good. Hence, the instrumental effect
is maximal in this case. Therefore, the subsidy appears more useful to self t than in the
general case when both goods are normal, and even more useful compared to the first
special case where no such correction is achieved. As a consequence, a smaller future
subsidy rate is sufficient to induce unbiased behavior.
3.5 Tax Revenues
We now compare the tax revenue necessary to induce first-best behavior by immediate
subsidies on consumption of the healthy good with the taxes required to reach the same
goal by future subsidies on the health outcome. Using z̃ and z from (3.7) and (3.10),















This comparison is motivated by the fact that in general, taxes induce some welfare
loss. Instead of modeling such costs explicitly, we simply assume that the government
prefers the form of subsidization that results in lower present value of taxes. That is,
formally, the government has lexicographic preferences over the allocation (c, d) and
tax revenues.
Alternatively, one can easily introduce a simple type of excess burden consisting of
a product of two factors: exogenous marginal costs of public funds (α) and tax revenue.
Integrating this excess burden, per period utility from (3.1) is modified to
ut = w(ct) + v(dt) + ht − ατt.
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Using this formulation, one obtains the government’s evaluation of the intertemporal
utility which the individual achieves when an immediate subsidy according to Proposi-
tion 1 is paid:




w(c∗) + v(d∗) + δh(c∗)
]
− αT̃ .
In the same way we compute the intertemporal utility with future subsidy according to
Proposition 2:




w(c∗) + v(d∗) + δh(c∗)
]
− αT.
Clearly, in both cases utility is decreasing in the present value of tax payments. There-
fore, it is worthwhile to ask which of the two subsidy schemes induces the first-best
consumption at lower cost to the government.10
The following proposition answers this question.
Proposition 3. If β < 1, inducing unbiased choices by immediately subsidizing healthy
consumption requires a lower present value of taxes than inducing unbiased choices by
subsidizing the future health outcome, T̃ < T .












βv′(d∗) + (1− β)δh′(c∗)c∗′(y)
.
For β < 1, this inequality is equivalent to
h′(c∗)c∗ ·
[
βv′(d∗) + (1− β)δh′(c∗)c∗′(y)
]
< v′(d∗)h(c∗) . (3.15)
Now observe that c∗′(y) = v′′/(w′′ + δh′′ + v′′) ≤ 1 and that the concavity of h(c∗)
implies with h(0) = 0 that h′(c∗)c∗ ≤ h(c∗). Therefore, one has
h′(c∗)c∗ ·
[




βv′(d∗) + (1− β)δh′(c∗)
]
.
10In a more elaborate set-up, one might account for the excess burden when determining the optimal
policy. This will probably result in lower subsidy rates, since there is then a trade-off between the
welfare cost of taxation and the health-improvement. However, this trade-off is not the subject of this
paper, where we instead focus on costs of corrective policies which implement the first-best choice.
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With (3.5), this inequality is equivalent to
h′(c∗)c∗ ·
[
βv′(d∗) + (1− β)δh′(c∗)c∗′(y)
]
≤ h(c∗) · [v′(d∗)− (1− β)w′(c∗)
]
.
For β < 1, this inequality implies (3.15) and hence T̃ < T . Q.E.D.
This result shows that the future subsidy is more expensive in terms of tax revenues
required than the immediate subsidy. Politically this means that those subsidy in-
struments which reward health-conscious behavior such as immediate financial rewards
are preferable to instruments which reward health outcomes such as health insurance
rebates.
Proposition 3 is a consequence of the various effects determining the optimal subsidy
rates explained after Proposition 2. The dominating force is the discounting effect,
that is the difference in discounting between the individual decision maker and the
government. The future subsidy achieves the same behavioral response as the present
subsidy only if it is sufficiently high to compensate for the current self’s present bias.
The government, in contrast, is unbiased in its intertemporal evaluation of tax revenues.
This is most clearly seen in the special case where the numeraire enters utility in a linear
fashion. In this case, to achieve the first-best, the future subsidy rate must be 1/βδ
times higher than the immediate subsidy rate. When calculating the present values,
the government discounts the future subsidy only with δ. Therefore, the present value
of the future subsidy still exceeds the present value of the immediate subsidy by the
factor 1/β.
In general, however, this result is mitigated by the instrumental effect. As discussed
after Proposition 2, the future subsidy allows self t to counteract the present bias of self
t + 1. Since this makes the future subsidy more valuable for self t, a smaller subsidy
rate is sufficient to achieve first-best consumption. Consequently, the present value of
the future subsidy is reduced to some extent. As Proposition 3 shows, however, the




In this section we take a different perspective on the political decision making process.
Until now we considered a paternalistic government with time-consistent preferences
which induces the individual to behave as if there was no present bias. In the following
we assume that the present-biased individual herself forms the government. This means
that the government on the one hand, like the individual, discounts more heavily be-
tween the current and the following periods than between later periods. On the other
hand, like the paternalistic government, it can impose taxes and pay subsidies. In this
scenario two questions arise: Will the present-biased policymaker commit to a subsidy
scheme which implements the first-best choice? If so, which form of the subsidy will
she prefer?
3.6.1 Commitment
To address the first issue, we compare the intertemporal utility that the present-biased
government obtains with the first-best allocation to the utility it would achieve without
any intervention.11 This laissez-faire allocation is given by the solution to the hyperbolic
self’s decision problem analyzed in Subsection 3.4.1 with z̃t = τ̃t = 0. From the first-
order condition (3.6), using ∂V (ht+1, xt+1)/∂ht+1 = 1, a stationary solution (cβ, dβ)
satisfies w′(cβ) + βδh
′(cβ) = v
′(dβ) and the budget constraint cβ + dβ = y. In this
solution, healthy consumption is lower and numeraire consumption is larger than in the
first-best, cβ < c
∗, dβ > d
∗.
The present-biased policymaker will commit to a subsidy scheme if the intertemporal
utility U∗ provided by first-best consumption (c∗, d∗) exceeds the intertemporal utility
Uβ provided by (cβ, dβ). Inserting c
∗ and d∗ or, respectively, cβ and dβ in (3.1) and
11In a more general approach one could allow the present-biased government to choose an allocation
which is different from these two. While it would be easy to characterize such an allocation, we
restrict attention to the choice between first-best and laissez-faire. By keeping the subsidy rates and
the resulting allocation unchanged, we focus on the choice of timing of the subsidy, thus maintaining
comparability with the previous analysis.
28
using (3.2) yields
U∗ = h0 + w(c
∗) + v(d∗) + βδh(c∗) + β
∞∑
t=1
δt[w(c∗) + δh(c∗) + v(d∗)]
Uβ = h0 + w(cβ) + v(dβ) + βδh(cβ) + β
∞∑
t=1
δt[w(cβ) + δh(cβ) + v(dβ)]
Inspecting these two expressions one notices the trade-off faced by the present-biased
policymaker in period 0. By implementing the subsidy as of period 0, she induces her
own consumption to change to the first-best values which, due to her present-bias, she
deems inferior to the laissez-faire values. Hence, she loses
∆β = w(cβ) + v(y − cβ) + βδh(cβ)− [w(c∗) + v(y − c∗) + βδh(c∗)] > 0
in period 0. In return she gains
∆∗ = w(c∗) + v(y − c∗) + δh(c∗)− [w(cβ) + v(y − cβ) + δh(cβ)] > 0
in every period t = 1, 2, .... This gain arises since self t = 0 likes the consumption
of future selves t = 1, 2, ... to be changed to the first-best values. Calculating present
values, one finds




The present-biased policymaker chooses to implement the subsidy if this expression is
non-negative.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the loss ∆β and the gain ∆
∗. For self 0, the marginal benefit of
her own healthy consumption is reduced by present-bias, as shown by the line labeled
w′(c) + βδh′(c) in Figure 3.1. For consumption levels between cβ and c
∗, this marginal
benefit falls short of the marginal benefit of the numeraire, expressed by the line labeled
v′(y − c) in Figure 3.1. The resulting loss ∆β is depicted by the vertically shaded area
between these two curves. In contrast, self 0 evaluates the marginal benefit of healthy
consumption by future selves t = 1, 2, ... without a present-bias. This marginal benefit












Figure 3.1: Gain (∆∗) and loss (∆β) procured to the present-biased policymaker when
committing to a subsidy scheme
the numeraire for consumption levels between cβ and c
∗. The gain ∆∗ is then represented
by the horizontally shaded area between the w′(c) + δh′(c) and v′(y − c) curves.
Clearly, the sign of U∗ − Uβ in (3.16) depends on the exact sizes of these areas,
and hence on the shape of the marginal utility schedules involved. However, if these
do not display too strong curvatures, the decision on the subsidy scheme is essentially
determined by the discount rates, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 4. Assume that w′′′ = v′′′ = h′′′ = 0. Then the present-biased policymaker








Proof: With w′′′ = v′′′ = h′′′ = 0, the marginal cost curves w+ βδh′, w+ δh′, and v′
are linear. Hence, ∆∗ = (c∗ − cβ)(1 − β)δh′(cβ)/2 and ∆β = (c∗ − cβ)(1 − β)δh′(c∗)/2
(see Figure 3.1). Inserting in (3.16) shows that U∗ − Uβ ≥ 0 is equivalent to (3.17).
Q.E.D.
Note that this result can easily be extended to the case where marginal utilities are
not exactly linear, as long as their curvatures are not too strong. Thus, the present-
biased policymaker will still choose to implement (not to implement) the first-best
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consumption levels if β/(1 − β) > (<)h′(c∗)/h′(cβ) as long as the third derivatives of
the utility functions are not too large.
Moreover, we note that this choice is time-consistent. Since the policymaker in
period 1 is in the same situation as the policymaker in period 0, she will commit to the
subsidy if and only if the policymaker in period 0 commits to it. Therefore, she will not
abolish the subsidy once it is introduced. Conversely, it would not be time-consistent if
the policymaker in period 0 decided to implement the subsidy scheme only from period
1 onward. While this is the best choice for this policymaker, the subsequent government
would behave in the same way and hence postpone the starting date for the subsidy
scheme by one more period, and so on.
Proposition 4 shows that a government which is formed by the individuals sometimes
fails to implement the first-best policy. This occurs if the future gains from committing
to increased healthy consumption count too little compared to the immediate loss from
forcing a change of behavior upon oneself. On the other hand, if discounting is not
too strong, that is, if inequality (3.17) is satisfied, one does not have to appeal to an
outside paternalistic government in order to induce first-best.
3.6.2 Tax Revenues
We now turn to the choice between immediate and future subsidies. We assume that
the present-biased government, like the paternalistic government, prefers the form of
subsidies that requires the lower present value of taxes. However, the present values

















The following proposition shows that the evaluation of tax revenues by the policymaker
now depends on the extent of her bias towards the present.
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Proof: See the Appendix 3.A.II.
In contrast to Proposition 5 the comparison of tax revenues by the present-biased
policymaker does not always favor the immediate subsidy scheme. This can be under-
stood by considering how the different computation of present values by the paternalistic
and the present-biased government interacts with the effects determining optimal sub-
sidy rates. The present-biased government discounts future tax payments more heavily,
therefore in its computation the discounting effect raises the cost of future subsidies
less than in the computation of the paternalistic government. As a consequence it is
possible that the instrumental effect dominates.
This can be illustrated by considering the two special cases presented in Subsection
3.4.3. In the first special case, where c∗′(y) = 0, the instrumental effect is absent. As
shown in the proof of Proposition 5, in this case β̂ = 0 implying that the future subsidy
is always more expensive that the immediate subsidy. Thus in this case both types of
government evaluate tax revenues in the same way.
In the second special case, where c∗′(y) = 1, the instrumental effect is strongest.
In this case Tβ < T̃β for all 0 < β < 1,
12 or equivalently β̂ = 1. Thus the strong
instrumental effect outweighs the discounting effect, so that the future subsidy is always
less expensive compared to the immediate subsidy.
Finally, we note that this example shows that there are parameter constellations
such that in the same time inequality (3.17) holds and Tβ < T̃β. Thus, even if the
present-biased policymaker agrees with the paternalistic government that the first-best
allocation is preferable to laissez-faire, she may choose a different form of subsidy.
12To see this, insert v′(d∗) = h′(c∗) = ε = 1 in equation (A.7) in the Appendix 3.A.II.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the intrapersonal game that arises when a consumer with present-
biased preferences faces an intertemporal consumption decision. In this setting, we
examine two forms of subsidizing health conscious behavior: immediate subsidies re-
lated to healthy consumption and future subsidies paid for a good health outcome. We
show that while both subsidies can achieve the first-best outcome, it then very much
depends on the policymaker’s preferences which one of the subsidy schemes will be
implemented.
This choice is driven by the balance of two effects determining the effectiveness of
the future subsidy. On the one hand, present-biased consumers perceive future subsidy
payments as less valuable, and hence, the effectiveness of rewards for health-conscious
behavior declines the further they are in the future. On the other hand, procuring later
selves with additional income raises future health-conscious consumption via an income
effect, which makes future subsidies more effective. Our first result shows that, for a
paternalistic government, the first effect always dominates so that the future subsidy
results in higher costs measured in present value terms. Politically, this implies that the
paternalistic government should concentrate on rewarding health-conscious behavior,
e.g. by lowering the prices of healthy goods, rather than promising future rewards for
successful health investments.
We contrast this result with the decision taken by a present-biased government
which is formed by time-inconsistent individuals. We show that such a government will
commit to a subsidy scheme which implements the unbiased choice when future gains
from commitment to increased healthy consumption exceed the immediate loss from
forcing a behavior change. However, in contrast to the first result, the comparison of
tax revenues by the biased government does not always favor the immediate subsidy
scheme. Since the present-biased government uses a stronger discount factor, the cost
of future subsidies count for relatively less. If the income effect on future behavior is
strong enough, the present-biased government will therefore favor the future subsidy
scheme.
Our results suggest a number of extensions, two of which we briefly discuss. The
first extension concerns the effectiveness of subsidies, which may not only depend on
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the timing, but also on the type of reward. As the examples given in the introduction
illustrate, premia for health-related activities are often awarded in kind. This matters
since we could imagine that for present-biased consumers money is a more attractive
immediate reward than, say, a free fitness card. In the same time, money can be spent
on many things including consumption which damages health, whereas a fitness card
procures an additional health benefit. Hence, it might be interesting to find out the
optimal combination of monetary and in-kind subsidies for health.
As a second extension, one can ask the general question of whether or not the
intervening government can be assumed to have time-consistent preferences. If, as in our
model, all individuals have to some extent present-biased preferences, who will form the
unbiased government? Alternatively, if there is a minority of unbiased individuals, can
we expect them to be elected by the biased majority? Conversely, when the government
is composed of biased individuals, how likely is that it will implement a policy that
actually goes against the current preferences of its members? And if so, will it be able
to put an end to its own postponing game? Finally, do the paternalistic or present-
biased governments have to give a reason for their action?
In our view, a convincing theory of policy intervention for correcting biased prefer-
ences should address such political economy issues. These considerations are, however,
beyond the scope of this paper and will be the subject of further research.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Appendix 3.A.I: Derivation of the Euler Equation
Computing the first-order conditions for a solution to (3.8) and using ∂ht+1/∂ct = h
′(ct)












· h′(c(xt)) = v′(d(xt)) ,
(A.1)
where λt is the Lagrange variable associated to the budget constraint. Inserting optimal
choices in the current-value function for the present-biased consumer gives
W (ht, xt) = w(c(xt)) + v(d(xt)) + ht + βδV (ht+1, xt+1). (A.2)





















From the envelope theorem, we have
∂W (ht, xt)
∂xt
= λt = v
′(d(xt)). (A.3)
Substituting next period’s optimal choices c(xt+1) and d(xt+1) into the continuation-
value function yields
V (ht+1, xt+1) = w(c(xt+1)) + v(d(xt+1)) + ht+1 + δV (ht+2, xt+2). (A.4)
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From (A.4) and the equivalent of (A.2) for period t+ 1, the current-value function and
the continuation-value function are linked by the equation13
β · V (ht+1, xt+1) = W (ht+1, xt+1)− (1− β)[w(c(xt+1)) + v(d(xt+1)) + ht+1].
By differentiation and substitution of the version of (A.3) for period t+ 1 we get
β · ∂V (ht+1, xt+1)
∂xt+1
= v′(d(xt+1))− (1− β) [w′(c(xt+1)) · c′(xt+1) + v′(d(xt+1)) · d′(xt+1)]
(A.5)
with w′(c(xt+1))·c′(xt+1)+v′(d(xt+1))·d′(xt+1) as the current marginal utility of income.
From the equation (A.1) we have
β · ∂V (ht+1, xt+1)
∂xt+1
=




Combining (A.5) and (A.6), and using ∂V (ht+1, xt+1)/∂ht+1 = 1, we obtain the Euler
equation (3.9).
13See also Harris and Laibson (2001), p. 940.
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Appendix 3.A.II: Proof of Proposition 5
Insert z̃ from (3.7) and z from (3.12) in (3.18) and (3.19) and define the elasticity of
health with respect to healthy consumption at the first-best value by ε = h′(c∗)c∗/h(c∗).











ε[1− δ(1− β)] (A.7)





Θ̃(β) we collect several properties of these functions. The





0 if c∗′(y) > 0




Θ̃(β) = ε(1− δ) (A.9)
where in the last line of (A.8) we use L’Hôpital’s rule. At β → 1 we find
lim
β→1
Θ(β) = 1. (A.10)
lim
β→1
Θ̃(β) = ε (A.11)
Computing the derivatives yields
Θ′(β) =
δh′(c∗)c∗′(y)v′(d∗)
[βv′(d∗) + (1− β)δh′(c∗)c∗′(y)]2
≥ 0 (A.12)
Θ̃′(β) = δε > 0 (A.13)
Since v′(d∗) > δh′(c∗)c∗′(y), we have Θ′′(β) ≤ 0, with strict inequality if c∗′(y) > 0.
Consider first c∗′(y) = 0. According to (A.8), (A.10) and (A.12) it follows that
Θ(β) = 1 for all 0 < β < 1. From (A.11) and (A.13) we have Θ̃(β) < ε for all
0 < β < 1. Since ε ≤ 1 this implies Θ(β) > Θ̃(β) for all 0 < β < 1. Hence the claim is
true for β̂ = 0.
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Consider now c∗′(y) > 0 and assume first that ε < 1. From (A.8) and (A.9) it holds
Θ(β) < Θ̃(β) for β close to zero. From (A.10) and (A.11) one has Θ(β) > Θ̃(β) for β
close to one. Hence there is an odd number of intersections of the functions Θ(β) and
Θ̃(β) in the interval (0, 1). Since Θ′′(β) < 0 and Θ̃′′(β) = 0 there can be at most two
such intersections. Altogether, we conclude that there is a unique intersection β̂ ∈ (0, 1)
such that Θ(β̂) = Θ̃(β̂). For β < β̂ (β > β̂), we have Θ(β) < Θ̃(β) (Θ(β) > Θ̃(β)), and
hence Tβ < T̃β (Tβ > T̃β) as claimed.
Finally we consider c∗′(y) > 0 and ε = 1. From (A.8) and (A.9) one sees again
Θ(β) < Θ̃(β) for β close to zero. From (A.10) and (A.11) one obtains limβ→1 Θ(β) =
limβ→1 Θ̃(β). As before, since Θ(β) is strictly concave and Θ̃(β) is linear, there can be at
most one intersection of both functions within the interval (0, 1). If such an intersection
exists it is β̂ as claimed in the proposition. Otherwise β̂ = 1 and T (β) < T̃ (β) for all
0 < β < 1. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 4
Determinants of Students’ Success at
University*
4.1 Introduction
The number of students in higher education worldwide is constantly increasing. To-
day’s students are more heterogeneous than ever before and possess a wide and diverse
range of characteristics and abilities. They often differ in educational background,
social status, skills, and academic potential, among others. As the diversity of the stu-
dent population increases, factors predicting students’ academic performance become a
matter of concern for institutions in the educational sector (Burton and Dowling, 2005;
Simpson, 2006). For example, knowledge about factors affecting academic success is
relevant for universities when selecting the most promising students. At an aggregate
level, based on such knowledge, policy can decide to what extent investment in ter-
tiary education should be directed towards those fields where large numbers of students
can expect to succeed, or be concentrated in fields which rather cater to a minority of
excellent students.
Our study addresses this concern by focusing on the question of whether, and if so
to what extent student characteristics can be used for predicting academic success. We
find a highly significant and positive effect of the high school leaving grade on academic
performance. Additionally, we narrow our view towards differences between fields of
study, grouped by faculties. We find that the importance of the high school leaving
grade differs strongly between fields. In some faculties graduation is less difficult to
achieve, but not necessarily associated with a good final grade. However, in other fac-
ulties, graduation seems to be less likely, but among those students who graduate, the
*This chapter originates from joint work with Johannes Meya, Katharina Suntheim and Robert
Schwager (see Danilowicz-Gösele et al. (2014)).
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final university grade is on average better and less differentiated. This points towards
diverging teaching and examination cultures among faculties. Some of them special-
ize in preparing a positive selection of students to science or demanding employment,
whereas others provide an education which is accessible for large numbers of high school
graduates with average abilities.
The probability of academic success and the reasons for dropping out of university
are subject of the continuously expanding research literature in many areas, notably
economics of education, psychology and sociology. These studies provide a consistent
picture of previous high school performance as the most prominent predictor of uni-
versity success (Baron-Boldt, 1989; Betts and Morel, 1999; Cyrenne and Chan, 2012).
Furthermore, various other personal characteristics are found to affect students’ aca-
demic performance, for instance gender (McNabb et al., 2002), age (Hong, 1984) or
socio-economic status (Arulampalam et al., 2005). Besides, the type of high school
visited is shown to influence both the probability of entering a college (Altonji et al.,
2005) as well as the probability of obtaining a good degree (Smith and Naylor, 2005).
At university, also the chosen field of study might matter (Achen and Courant, 2009).
Although there is a vast amount of literature on factors predicting academic success,
our paper differs from previous work in this area in a number of ways. Firstly, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes a comprehensive administrative
data set of student population, that aims to be an encompassing analysis of students’
characteristics as predictors for academic success at university in Germany. In contrast
to much of the earlier work, we can track students’ academic careers from the admission
day onward. For instance, we observe changes in fields of study. Secondly, we analyze
not only one but three dimensions of academic success: graduation from the university,
graduation within a chosen field of study and final grade of the university degree.
Thirdly, differentiating between faculties allows us to observe different examination
cultures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 4.2 we present a brief
overview of the related literature. In Section 4.3 we describe our dataset, explain the
variables used, and lay out the empirical setup. We turn our attention to our empirical




As the universities’ selection process is often based on high school performance, almost
all literature dealing with students’ academic performance examines in the first place
whether the high school Grade Point Average (GPA) is a valid predictor for university
success. According to the meta-analysis of Robbins et al. (2004), the correlation be-
tween secondary school grades and university GPA is on average about 0.41. Trapmann
et al. (2007) find a mean corrected validity between 0.26 and 0.53 for high school grades
predicting university success by using a meta-analysis approach including studies from
Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain and Norway. In this sample, the
German high school GPA has the highest validity.
However, the predictive effectiveness of secondary school grades on academic per-
formance seems to be different for diverse groups. For instance, Dobson and Skuja
(2005) show that high university entrance scores are indeed a good predictor, but not
for every field of study. They find a strong correlation between the university entrance
scores and students’ academic performance in agriculture, engineering and science, and
almost no correlation in education and health studies. This corresponds to the results
of Trapmann et al. (2007) who find a high predictive power for engineering and natural
sciences and a comparatively low validity for psychology.
There is also a large number of contributions showing that students with the same
entry grades are often found to perform differently in tertiary education, which sug-
gests the importance of other factors when predicting university success. Based on
an analysis of about 300 students in a regional equity and access program of Monash
University, Australia, Levy and Murray (2005) report that an appropriate coaching
program can reduce the impact of discrepancy in university entrance scores. Conse-
quently, the entrance scores themselves may not be able to capture all relevant student
characteristics.
In a study by Grebennikov and Skaines (2009) at the University of Western Sydney,
data relating to about 9,000 students was analyzed in order to determine a set of
variables predicting students’ academic performance and retention. They find that the
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odds of dropping out without applying to other educational institutions are significantly
higher for part-time and mature students, who tend to have less time for studying and
face stricter financial constraints. Furthermore, the probability of early withdrawal
from university is particularly high for students from an English-speaking background
and with a low grade point average.
An analysis of academic, psychological, cognitive, and demographic predictors for
academic performance can be found in McKenzie and Schweitzer (2001). For this
purpose, they examine a group of about 200 first-year students and find significant
coefficients for the university entry score (accounting for 39% of the variance in GPA),
student institution integration (accounting for 3% of the variance in GPA) and self-
efficacy (accounting for 8% of the variance in the GPA). When both the measure of
integration and the measure of self-efficacy are included in the model, the prediction of
GPA at university is improved by 12%.
Looking at a data set of the population of newly enrolled students at the University
of Brussels, Arias Ortiz and Dehon (2008) examine the probability of succeeding the
first year at university by accounting for individual characteristics, prior schooling and
socio-economic background. According to their results, socio-economic background,
especially the mother’s level of education and the father’s occupational activity, mat-
ters for students’ academic success. In addition, they observe differences in academic
performance between students coming from different high school programs.
Other factors mentioned in the literature that may help identify students at risk
of failing include: standardized pre-university tests (Cohn et al., 2004), study skills
(Robbins et al., 2004), the ability to adapt to the university environment (McInnis
et al., 2000; Peat et al., 2001) or first-year experience at the university (Krause et al.,
2005). Further studies emphasize the importance of psychosocial variables such as
goal and institutional commitment (Tinto, 1975), emotional intelligence (Parker et al.,
2004), relationship with the faculty (Girves and Wemmerus, 1988) and social support
(Gerdes and Mallinckrodt, 1994).
Altogether it appears to be generally accepted that high school performance is the
best predictor for university success. We confirm this result using a new and compre-
hensive dataset from a German university. Contrary to the mixed results about the
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link between high school GPA and success in specific fields, we find that such a link is
present in all faculties, albeit in different forms. Specifically, by distinguishing between
several measures of success, we are able to describe in detail how this relationship varies
across fields. Finally, again contrasting with some of the results cited, our data does
not support the view that social origin or income have strong additional impact on
university success once high school grades are taken into account.
4.3 Data and Approach
In our analysis we use an extensive administrative dataset from Göttingen University,
Germany, which encompasses detailed, anonymized information on more than 12,000
students. One part of the data is collected when students enroll at university and
contains information about the student’s high school leaving certificate, her parental
address, gender and type of health insurance. The other part includes information
about the student’s university career, such as the field of study, the reason for her
leaving university, whether she obtained a degree and if so, which one.
In addition, we use data on the purchasing power of the German zip-code areas which
is provided by GfK, a market research firm.15 The index is based on data provided by the
German tax offices as well as other relevant statistics, for instance regarding pensions
and unemployment benefits.
Detailed information on data filtering and processing can be found in Appendix
4.A.I.
4.3.1 Variable Description and Institutional Background
We use the following three measures of university success: the probability of finishing
studies with a degree, the probability of finishing a chosen field of study with a degree
and the grade of the final university degree. For the first two measures, it is necessary
to distinguish between students who drop out and those who change institution. For
this reason, we exclude students who mention that they leave Göttingen University in
order to continue studying at another university from the sample.
15GfK is one of the biggest companies worldwide in the field of market research and collects infor-
mation on people’s lifestyle and consumption behavior.
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As one is generally considered to be a successful student if one holds some degree
after finishing university, we first examine a binary variable which describes whether the
student graduates at all from university. The variable is equal to one for all students
who finish their studies with any kind of degree at Göttingen University, and zero
otherwise.
However, since in Germany students have to decide on their field of study as soon
as they register for university, it is not uncommon that more than one subject is chosen
or that the major is changed within the first few years. Therefore, we narrow down
the definition of university success by using an additional outcome variable, labeled
‘graduation within faculty’, measuring success in each program the student enrolled in.
This implies that when a student changes her field of study or enrolls in more than
one degree program, several observations are generated. Thereby, success or failure are
registered individually for every observation dependent on whether the student obtained
a degree in this specific field of study or not. For example, for a student who changed
her subject of study once during her university career and completed only the second
study subject, the dataset will contain two observations. For the first observation,
the variable describing success equals zero, and for the second, it is one. However, as
study programs within the same faculty are typically quite similar with respect to their
content or required abilities, a change of subject is only seen as a failure if it also implies
a change of the faculty.
The third outcome variable is the grade of the university degree. As some stu-
dents are enrolled in more than one study program or complete two consecutive degree
programs, we create individual observations for every final university degree obtained.
Furthermore, we transform grades into the U.S. grading scale in order to make results
internationally comparable and easier to interpret. In Germany, the grading schedule
traditionally ranges from 1.0 to 5.0, with 1.0 being the best grade to achieve and 4.0
the worst grade that is still a pass. This implies that the better the performance, the
lower the grade. The outcome variable university GPA, which we use in our analysis, is
a transformation of the actual grade achieved. It ranges from 1.0 to 4.0 with 4.0 being
the best grade to obtain and 1.0 the worst that is still a pass.16
16We transformed the grades into the U.S. grading scale by subtracting the final university grade
from five. For legal studies the special grade vollbefriedigend is treated as a 2.5.
44
The central exogenous variable used in the analysis is the high school GPA, a trans-
formation of the grade of the high school leaving certificate. Similar to the grade of the
university degree, it is converted to the U.S. grading scale with 4.0 being the best and
1.0 the worst passing grade.
The students’ socio-economic background is captured by two variables: the type of
health insurance and the purchasing power of the parents’ zip-code area.
Due to a particular institutional feature of the German health insurance system,
the type of health insurance can be used as a proxy for the students’ educational and
socio-economic background. In order to choose a private instead of the generally com-
pulsory public health insurance, one has to earn more than a certain amount of income
(2013 : 52,200 Euro gross income per year), be self-employed or work as civil servant.
As most students are insured through their parents, the type of health insurance a
student holds contains information about whether her parents satisfy at least one of
the above criteria. Specifically, a large group of civil servants are teachers, and many
self-employed and high earners hold a university degree. Overall, in 2008, 56.7 percent
of the people being privately insured held a degree enabling registration at a university
or a university of applied science, 38.0 percent had completed university or university
of applied science with a degree or a Ph.D (Finkenstädt and Keßler, 2012). Within the
total German population, these shares were much lower, amounting to 24.4 and 13.0
percent respectively (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009).
The second socio-economic variable we use is an index of the purchasing power
within the zip-code area of the student’s home address evaluated in the year 2007. The
index, provided by GfK, is measured relative to the German average, and normalized
to 100. For example, an index value of 110 means that the purchasing power of this
area is 10% higher than the German average. Since German zip-code areas are fairly
small, with the biggest cities like Hamburg or Berlin encompassing up to 191 different
zip-codes, and assuming a certain degree of residential sorting according to income, we
are confident that this local measure approximates the students’ economic background
reasonably well.
As additional covariates we include indicator variables for male students, the sixteen
German states and the university’s thirteen faculties.
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To get a more diversified picture of the determinants of university success, we also
divide the data into sub-samples by faculty. At Göttingen University the various fields
of study are assigned to thirteen faculties: theology, law, medicine, humanities, mathe-
matics, physics, chemistry, geology/geography, biology, forestry, agriculture, economic
sciences, and social sciences. A detailed analysis of individual faculties seems worth-
while since they may differ with regard to scientific approach, organizational structure
and general conditions of studying.
4.3.2 Summary Statistics
The final dataset contains 12,315 students out of which 48% obtained a degree at
Göttingen University. The remaining 52% left Göttingen University without completing
a degree. Taking into account that students might be enrolled in more than one degree
program or change fields of study during their university career increases the number
of observations to 16,931. For 49% of these observations the respective field of study is
completed with a degree (Table 4.1).
When taking a look at those students who graduated, we see that a final grade is
registered for 8,204 observations. This implies that around one third of the students
who finished their studies obtained more than one university degree. The reason for
this could be the introduction of the consecutive study programs which by definition
leads to more than one degree for many students.
The mean university GPA is 2.97 and hence, higher than the mean high school GPA
of all students in the dataset which is 2.50. Furthermore, the standard deviation of the
final university grade is smaller than the standard deviation of the high school GPA.
This indicates that compared to the grade of the high school leaving certificate, the
distribution of the final university grade is compressed and shifted to the upper end of
the grading scale.
With regard to the other covariates, we see that 47% of the students are male
and 22% hold a private health insurance. The mean purchasing power index is 98.50,
meaning that the mean purchasing power in our sample is 1.5% lower than the German
average.
Taking a look at the distribution of students across faculties, we see that the highest
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
High school GPA 12315 2.50 0.63 1.10 4.00
Graduation (university) 12315 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Graduation (within faculty) 16931 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Final grade 8204 2.97 0.59 1.00 4.00
Male 12315 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Private health insurance 12315 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Purchasing power index 12315 98.50 11.79 64.72 186.99
Theology 16931 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
Law 16931 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Medicine 16931 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Humanities 16931 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Mathematics 16931 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Physics 16931 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Chemistry 16931 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Geology/Geography 16931 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Biology 16931 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
Forest sciences 16931 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Agriculture 16931 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Economic sciences 16931 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Social sciences 16931 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Grades transformed to 1-4 Scale, with 4 being the best grade and 1 being the worst grade
that is still a pass.
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share of students is studying at the faculty of humanities (20%). Theology, on the other
hand, is the smallest faculty with a share of 2%.
4.3.3 Empirical Setup
We start by examining the broadest measure of academic success, namely, whether or
not a student graduates from university at all. Afterwards, we narrow our view towards
graduation within fields, considering a change of field as a failure in the abandoned
subject. Finally, we focus on the final grade of the university degree. This grade is a
measure of the relative success within the group of successful students completing their
studies.
For each of the three outcome variables we start with the GPA achieved at high
school as independent variable only and continue by adding the full set of controls.
These also include indicator variables for all 16 German states excluding Lower Saxony,
the state where Göttingen is located, so as to reflect potential differences between the
states concerning schooling systems and grading standards. Afterwards, we allow for
differing effects by faculties. The binary outcome, graduation, is analyzed using probit
models. For the continuous outcome variable, university grade, we use simple OLS
models. In all the regressions we cluster standard errors by administrative district.
In order to interpret the regression results of the probit models right away, we
display marginal effects for a benchmark student.17 For categorical variables the effects
are calculated as discrete changes from the base category. Our benchmark student is
characterized by the average high school leaving grade and income, and the mode of
categorical variables. Accordingly, the student is female, holds a public health insurance
and finished high school in Lower Saxony.
17The coefficients of the probit regressions can be found in Tables 4.A.1-4.A.3.b in Appendix 4.A.II.
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4.4 Results
There is a strong ex ante expectation that the better the high school leaving grade is,
the better the performance at university should be. High income as well as a private
health insurance status are expected to have positive effects on academic success. Low
family income, proxied by the purchasing power index, might inhibit academic success
through channels different from performance in high school. Students from low income
families might lack sufficient monetary support and thus have to earn their living ex-
penses outside university, such as working in bars, shops or factories, and thus would
have less time to study. They might be less able to buy books that are not (numerous)
in the libraries or other auxiliary devices such as software packages. However, payments
according to the Federal Training Assistance Act (BAföG) should at least partly coun-
teract this effect by providing financial support for students from poorer families.18 We
do not have a clear ex ante expectation about the influence of gender and the different
faculties.
4.4.1 University Level
Table 4.2 shows the expected highly significant and positive effect of the high school
leaving grade on academic success. A marginal improvement of this grade increases
the probability of the benchmark student to graduate at all from university by about
21 percentage points per grade, and within fields by about 16 percentage points. An
improvement of the high school leaving certificate by one full grade is associated with
an improvement of the expected final grade by slightly below 0.4 grades.
The controls are of lesser importance: All else being equal, coming from a family that
provides a student with private health insurance increases the estimated probability of
the benchmark student of graduating at all or within a faculty by 5 or 4 percentage
points respectively. This effect is highly significant but relatively small: Being privately
insured raises the graduation probability by as much as having a 0.25 better grade at
18These payments are based on the income of the parents and the student. They can amount to up
to 670 Euro per month (2010) of which only 50% are to be repaid, capped at a maximum amount due
of 10,000 Euro. In winter term 2009/2010 almost 20% of all students in Göttingen received payments
according to this act.
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Table 4.2: University level
Graduation Graduation Final Grade
-All Faculties- -Within Faculty-
Probit Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High school GPA 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.165*** 0.161*** 0.371*** 0.386***
(28.121) (28.444) (21.810) (26.022) (0.010) (0.010)
Male -0.006 -0.009 -0.019
(-0.548) (-1.077) (0.014)
Private health insurance 0.053*** 0.036*** 0.014
(4.825) (3.826) (0.015)




States included No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.048 0.051 0.031 0.033
Log Likelihood -8120 -8093 -11368 -11338
R2 0.155 0.169
Observations 12315 12315 16931 16931 8204 8204
Columns 1-4: marginal effects for benchmark student, z-statistic in parentheses; columns 5-6: coefficients,
standard errors in parentheses; clustered by counties; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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high school. Conditional on graduating, there is no significant effect of the health
insurance on the final grade.
The income variable does not show significant effects in any of the regressions pre-
sented in Table 4.2. This might indicate that financial aid, provided according to the
Federal Training Assistance Act, is performing well. It could also mean that income
alone is not very important for academic success if aspects such as the educational fam-
ily background, as captured by the health insurance status, are accounted for. Another
explanation could be that those who are negatively affected by their low family income
have never even started university education in the first place.
Finally, the higher importance of the high school leaving GPA with respect to overall
graduation compared to graduation within a field might indicate that being a good
(high school) student does not help to find the most preferred field of study right away.
Obviously, re-orientation at an early stage of the studies towards a field that fits the
student’s own preferences or abilities better should not be seen as severe as an overall
failure to graduate. This is especially true with respect to international comparisons.
For instance in the U.S. a major might be chosen only after trying several fields whereas
in Germany students select their field prior to entering university.
4.4.2 Faculties
Some students change their field of study while being enrolled. This might reflect some
change in their preferences or time needed to search for the perfect match. At the same
time it might also reflect differences in the (perceived) degree of difficulty to graduate
or to get a good grade. Every now and then a discussion arises in Germany about
whether or not some faculties give good grades too easily. The faculties in question will
usually defend themselves by pointing out the high ability of their student body (see for
instance Krass and Scherf, 2012). In order to address this issue, we allow for differing
effects by faculties. Firstly, we add indicator variables for the 13 faculties excluding the
base category/faculty, humanities. Afterwards we present separate regressions for each
of the faculties.
Column (1) of Table 4.3 shows marginal effects for a probit regression, estimat-










Private health insurance 0.047*** 0.023*
(5.040) (0.011)






















Economic sciences 0.185*** -0.414***
(12.445) (0.018)









Column 1: marginal effects for benchmark student,
z-statistics in parentheses; column 2: coefficients,
standard errors in parentheses; clustered by county;
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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corresponding OLS results for the final university grade given graduation.
Many indicator variables of faculties show effects that are significant at the 0.1
percent level. For the benchmark student the predicted probability of graduating,
given she started studying at the faculty of humanities, is about 39%; given successful
graduation, her expected final grade is 3.1. A male student is almost 2 percentage points
less likely to graduate within the given faculty compared to the benchmark. Ceteris
paribus, if he does, he receives slightly better grades. The private health insurance
status is associated with both better grades and a higher probability of graduating.
All else being equal, the predicted probability of graduating at the faculty of eco-
nomic sciences is about 19 percentage points higher than at the faculty of humanities;
at the faculty of mathematics it is 6 percentage points lower than at the base faculty.
Given graduation, the faculty of economic sciences awards, ceteris paribus, a final grade
that is more than 0.4 grades worse than the respective grade at the faculty of humani-
ties. This difference is greater than the expected change in the degree associated with
an improvement of the high school leaving certificate by one full grade. The worst
grades are awarded by the faculty of law.19
Doing the same regressions separately by faculties, the picture gets more differen-
tiated. Tables 4.4.a and 4.4.b reveal strong differences with respect to how important
the high school GPA is for the probability of graduating at the different faculties of
Göttingen University. The effect is not significantly different from zero at the faculty
of geology and geography, and it is strongest at the medical school and the faculty of
chemistry. For the benchmark student at these two faculties, a marginal increase in the
GPA earned in high school is associated with an increase in the graduation probability
by almost 29 percentage points per grade. At the faculty of social sciences, the effect
is only about one third of that size.
Private health insurance status, which proxies a high socio-economic background, is
significant and has a positive sign for about half of the faculties, while being insignificant
for the other faculties. Purchasing power is also of little importance for the probability
of graduating at the faculty level. It is significant only at the faculty of social sciences.
For illustration and further comparison of faculties, Table 4.5 provides predicted
19The faculty of law is traditionally known to only rarely award very good grades. Accordingly, not
too much attention should be given to this fact.
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Table 4.4
Table 4.4.a: Graduation by faculties
Graduation by Faculties
Theology Law Medicine Humanities Mathematics Physics Chemistry
High school GPA 0.180*** 0.256*** 0.285*** 0.187*** 0.279*** 0.209*** 0.285***
(4.558) (11.171) (9.357) (12.378) (6.412) (7.185) (9.016)
Male 0.112 0.007 0.019 -0.114*** 0.060 0.110* 0.043
(1.789) (0.231) (0.685) (-6.688) (1.677) (2.257) (1.004)
Private health insurance 0.184* 0.019 0.080** 0.068*** 0.131* -0.013 0.011
(2.507) (0.611) (2.923) (3.541) (2.464) (-0.310) (0.253)
Purchasing power index 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.633) (-0.031) (-0.729) (1.522) (-0.575) (-0.246) (0.349)
States included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.076 0.125 0.059 0.164 0.111 0.137
Log Likelihood -167 -774 -896 -2128 -367 -345 -378
Observations 284 1246 1481 3342 660 567 644
Marginal effects for benchmark student, z-statistics in parentheses; clustered by county; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 4.4.b: Graduation by faculties
Graduation by Faculties
Geology/Geography Biology Forest Sciences Agriculture Economic Sciences Social Sciences
High school GPA 0.069 0.176*** 0.152*** 0.132*** 0.159*** 0.086***
(1.875) (8.304) (3.971) (5.451) (8.061) (4.521)
Male -0.127* -0.016 0.031 0.049 -0.022 -0.027
(-2.151) (-0.587) (0.651) (1.471) (-1.071) (-1.225)
Private health insurance 0.061 0.037 0.040 -0.038 0.064** 0.011
(1.070) (1.113) (1.056) (-1.071) (3.110) (0.388)
Purchasing power index 0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.004***
(1.436) (-1.826) (-0.029) (-1.390) (0.553) (3.340)
States included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.047 0.043 0.024 0.032 0.019
Log Likelihood -360 -923 -425 -1004 -1819 -1198
Observations 542 1410 666 1546 2740 1778
Marginal effects for benchmark student, z-statistics in parentheses; clustered by county; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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probabilities of graduation based on the estimation results underlying Tables 4.4.a and
4.4.b. The predictions for the benchmark student are presented in the middle column
(mean high school GPA). The remaining predictions deviate from the usual bench-
mark by the high school GPA used. We define low and high high school GPA as the
mean GPA minus two standard deviations and mean GPA plus two standard deviations
respectively.
Although we do not want to put too much emphasis on these predictions, they serve
to illustrate the rather large differences between faculties. The predicted probability of
graduation for the benchmark student is between roughly 20 and 60 percent. Based on
these predictions, a student with a low high school GPA can hardly expect to graduate
at some of the faculties, such as mathematics and physics. At other faculties chances to
graduate are still relatively high; the predicted probabilities for such a student are 45
and 39 percent at the faculties of agriculture and economic sciences respectively. For an
otherwise identical student with a high high school GPA the predictions vary between
about 50 and 80 percent.
Tables 4.6.a and 4.6.b show corresponding regression results for final grades at grad-
uation. There is a highly significant positive effect of the high school GPA at every
faculty. However, the importance of this GPA differs strongly. It is highest at the
faculty of mathematics, where the expected grade at graduation is more than half a
grade better for every full grade of the high school leaving certificate. At the faculty
of chemistry, where the coefficient of high school GPA is the smallest, the effect is
only about half that size. Given graduation, male students can expect slightly better
grades than their female fellow students in about half of the faculties. The effects of
health insurance status and purchasing power are indistinguishable from zero at most
faculties.20
Figure 4.1 visualizes the relationship between the GPA earned at university and at
high school across selected faculties. The red lines represent fitted values for female
students who are publicly insured, come from a zip code area with average purchasing
20There is a surprisingly large, highly significant, positive effect of the private health insurance status
on the final grade at university at the faculty of Theology. Taking this coefficient at face value, a reason
for this strong effect could be that children of pastors in Germany are privately insured. However, due
to the small sample size of the underlying regression, we refrain from emphasizing this finding.
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Table 4.5: Predicted probabilities of graduation by faculties
High School GPA
Low Mean High
Theology 0.10 0.27 0.53
Law 0.14 0.40 0.72
Medicine 0.19 0.52 0.83
Humanities 0.21 0.42 0.66
Mathematics 0.04 0.24 0.67
Physics 0.05 0.21 0.54
Chemistry 0.06 0.30 0.69
Geology/Geography 0.41 0.50 0.59
Biology 0.30 0.51 0.72
Forest sciences 0.38 0.57 0.75
Agriculture 0.45 0.62 0.77
Economic sciences 0.39 0.59 0.77
Social sciences 0.34 0.45 0.56
Predicted probability of graduating at a faculty for fe-
male students who are publicly insured, come from a
zip code area with average purchasing power, and fin-
ished high school in Lower Saxony. Low and high high
school GPA are defined as the mean GPA minus two




Table 4.6.a: Grades by faculties
Final Grade by Faculties
Theology Law Medicine Humanities Mathematics Physics Chemistry
High school GPA 0.434** 0.428*** 0.279*** 0.393*** 0.503*** 0.291*** 0.270***
(0.157) (0.030) (0.044) (0.019) (0.043) (0.051) (0.052)
Male -0.078 0.090* -0.066 0.080** 0.150* 0.166* 0.099
(0.208) (0.038) (0.050) (0.024) (0.068) (0.067) (0.065)
Private health insurance 0.536*** 0.016 0.053 0.036 0.081 0.018 -0.052
(0.146) (0.052) (0.049) (0.023) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059)
Purchasing power index -0.019* 0.001 0.005** 0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.004
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 3.125*** 0.743** 1.739*** 1.971*** 1.177** 2.551*** 2.957***
(0.797) (0.278) (0.210) (0.128) (0.371) (0.287) (0.312)
States included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.324 0.234 0.097 0.277 0.421 0.184 0.171
Observations 86 502 776 1365 253 249 270
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses; clustered by county; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 4.6.b: Grades by faculties
Final Grade by Faculties
Geology/Geography Biology Forest Sciences Agriculture Economic Sciences Social Sciences
High school GPA 0.293*** 0.288*** 0.352*** 0.386*** 0.398*** 0.398***
(0.057) (0.029) (0.041) (0.024) (0.019) (0.026)
Male -0.064 0.113*** 0.116** 0.018 0.017 0.054
(0.051) (0.033) (0.043) (0.029) (0.022) (0.027)
Private health insurance 0.011 0.013 0.041 -0.087* 0.014 0.050
(0.053) (0.030) (0.053) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Purchasing power index -0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 2.807*** 2.339*** 1.573*** 2.030*** 1.575*** 2.110***
(0.335) (0.159) (0.250) (0.171) (0.129) (0.171)
States included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.212 0.158 0.184 0.232 0.247 0.250
Observations 250 784 408 953 1534 774
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses; clustered by county; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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power and finished high school in Lower Saxony. We can notice from the upper two
panels of this figure that grades in humanities are generally better than in economic
sciences. The lower two panels show that the relationship between high school GPA
and university grade is much steeper in mathematics than in biology.
Dots represent one or several observations. Fitted values are the predicted university GPA for female students who are
publicly insured, come from a zip code area with average purchasing power, and finished high school in Lower Saxony.
Figure 4.1: Grades at selected faculties
Comparing the faculties with the highest number of students, humanities and eco-
nomic sciences, it seems to be easier to graduate in economic sciences whereas the
expected grade conditional on graduation is worse. This pattern can also be found for
a couple of other faculties and might suggest differences in grading and examination cul-
ture between the faculties. It seems that at some faculties it is more difficult to obtain
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a degree while the grades given differentiate less strongly between students. However,
at others achieving a degree is more likely while the grades obtained vary more within
the grading scale.
There are a number of possible mechanisms which might contribute to these faculty-
specific results. Firstly, students may self-select into faculties on unobservable charac-
teristics related to the outcome variables. For example, some students may be more
motivated to obtain good grades at university than they were in high school. If such
students disproportionately choose humanities rather than mathematics or economics,
we will find better grades in the former faculty conditional on high school GPA. While
we cannot exclude such self-selection with the data at hand, in our view it is not very
plausible that students of various faculties should differ precisely in this respect.
Alternatively, and arguably more convincingly, the results may be driven by features
of the teaching and grading system in the respective faculties. A first explanation along
this line is based on the similarity between curricula in high school and in university.
The high school grade is a composite of a comprehensive variety of subjects whereas
university studies are more specialized. Since students likely choose subjects which
fit their specific abilities, one may expect that in highly specialized fields, university
grades are better and less closely associated with high school GPA than in broader
subjects. Given that the impact of high school GPA on university grades is largest in
mathematics, which is a more specialized field than social science or economics, this
explanation, however, does not find much support in the data.
Instead, the differences in grades are likely to reflect different grading cultures.
Some faculties may simply be willing to award good grades to most students without
differentiating strongly among good and mediocre performance. More subtly, an upward
drift of average grades may be built in the structure of some degree programs. When a
program grants ample choice among electives, students can avoid difficult or unpleasant
courses while still obtaining the degree. Moreover, if students can freely choose courses,
teachers might have an incentive to attract students by grading leniently. As a result,
grades from such a program will be compressed at the upper end of the scale compared
to programs with a more rigid structure of compulsory courses.
Although we have some sympathy for the last explanation, our data do not permit
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to conclusively distinguish between these mechanisms. Instead, we confine ourselves to
pointing out the main result of this paper: The relationship between high school grades
and university success varies in a statistically discernible manner among faculties, which
hints at some differences in grading, teaching, and examination cultures.
4.5 Discussion and Policy Implications
In this paper, the determinants of studying successfully are analyzed using data from
more than 12,000 students from Göttingen University. Two main results are shown.
Firstly, the high school leaving grade is by far the best predictor of both the probability
of graduating and the final grade obtained at university. Other factors, notably gender
or social origin, play only a minor role. Secondly, differences emerge among the various
faculties regarding grading and graduation policies. In some faculties, like humanities
or social sciences, the rate of graduation is low but those who graduate can expect to
obtain quite good grades even when they start from a weaker academic base as measured
by the high school GPA. In other faculties, such as economic sciences or forest sciences,
the chance of obtaining a degree is relatively high whereas grades are moderate, and
strongly linked to high school GPA. Finally, in some faculties such as mathematics and
physics, graduation appears to be very difficult and good grades are hard to obtain,
especially for weaker students.
These findings carry a number of implications both for the university and for the
students individually as well as for education policy in general. Most obviously, our
results support the current process of admission to German universities, which is based
primarily on high school GPA. Clearly, this practice contributes to improving the aca-
demic success of those admitted. We do not find any evidence that adding other in-
formation can improve the selection. Specifically, variables capturing income or social
background have a comparatively low explanatory power. This suggests that students
from disadvantaged social backgrounds do not, on average, have abilities relevant for
success at university which are undocumented by high school grades. Consequently,
granting privileged access to minorities or providing universities with financial incen-
tives to admit more students from poor districts can be a useful policy to raise equity
in higher education, but will not enhance the overall quality of the students. It appears
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that most of the impact of social origin on university achievement is already absorbed
in the high school leaving grade. Consequently, policy should start addressing social
imbalances in educational outcomes at earlier stages of the academic career.
For prospective students, the faculty specific results, summarized in Table 4.5, may
give useful hints about what subject to choose. A student with mean high school GPA
has a higher chance of graduating if she chooses agriculture or economic sciences rather
than humanities or social sciences. If obtaining some degree irrespective of the field is
very important for her, such a student should enroll in the former rather than in the
latter faculties. Considering mathematics, physics, or chemistry, the recommendation
is even clearer: The average student will graduate in these faculties with a probability
of 30% or less. For weaker students with high school GPA substantially below the
mean this probability falls below 10%. This suggests that these three fields are almost
unfeasible for students in the bottom half of the ability distribution and that such
students are well advised to opt for other fields.
Extending the principle of selection on academic merit to the aggregate level obvi-
ously raises a consistency issue: Not every university or field can be restricted to the
best students, since the weaker ones also will have to be placed somewhere, or else
must be told not to study. This points out a basic choice which education policy must
make: Should universities provide an excellent education for the most able individuals
at a level defined by the current state of knowledge, or should tertiary education be
targeted to large numbers of students and settle for an academic level accessible for
these? Related to this, there are competing views on the main purpose of university
studies. On one hand, in Humboldt’s tradition, one may see academic studies mainly
as a tool of personal intellectual enhancement, where knowledge, understanding and
academic debate are rewards in themselves. On the other hand, studies may be seen as
an investment in productivity, whose main reward comes in the form of a higher wage.
In the former view, graduation and examination grades are of lesser importance. In the
latter case, the signaling value of a degree is likely to be essential for employers. As a
consequence, the labor market will honor only completed degrees, and a wage premium
will be paid for good grades as long as these are rare enough so as to convey credible
information.
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The results presented in this paper suggest that faculties take different sides in this
debate. In humanities, graduation rates are relatively low and individual grades are
less differentiated than in other fields. This corresponds to the idea that one does not
study for the sake of the examination or for a higher wage, but for intrinsic motivation.
Quite possibly these fields specifically attract students with such expectations. In this
view, a low completion rate in such subjects should not be seen as a sign of failure.
These fields offer students an education tailored to their abilities and preferences and
students use this offer to the extent which is individually optimal. On the other end
of the scale, examinations in mathematics, physics and chemistry are highly selective.
Thereby, these fields cannot cater to large numbers of students, but they prepare those
who make it for demanding sections of the labor market. Similarly, economic sciences
serve the labor market by awarding differentiated grades while still being accessible for
large numbers of weaker students.
These considerations shed some light on the recommendation, repeatedly voiced by
the OECD (see for instance OECD, 2013, p. 151), that Germany should produce more
university graduates and the corresponding complaint by employers’ organizations that
German industry faces a shortage of graduates from mathematics, natural sciences, and
engineering (see Anger et al., 2013). It is certainly conceivable that reforms in secondary
schooling can raise the number of students entering university. It appears far-fetched,
however, that a large fraction of those additional students will display academic abilities
superior to those of the average current student. Our results show that average or
below average students will typically be unable to successfully complete a degree in
mathematics, physics or chemistry. Therefore it seems highly unlikely that an increase
in university enrollment will produce substantial numbers of additional graduates in the
subjects required by industry, at least as long as the concerned faculties are unwilling
to lower their academic standards. If this does not occur, any increase in university
enrollment will lead to larger numbers of graduates in those fields which cater to the
preferences and abilities of the majority of students but not in those fields which firms
demand.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Appendix 4.A.I: Data Processing
We exclude students for whom not all information is available as well as students for
whom we observe pure data errors, such as when the grade of the high school leaving
certificate is not within the possible interval. Ph.D. students are also dropped from the
dataset. The reason for this is that they form a highly selective group and their success
may be influenced by other factors than regular students’ performance. Furthermore,
we only take into account students who either finished university with a degree or
dropped out of their study program. Since students are asked to give the reason for
dropping out when they leave university, we can distinguish between real drop outs and
students who intend to continue their studies at another university. We exclude these
students from the sample in order not to register a drop out for the latter group.
As German and foreign high school leaving grades may not be comparable and
university success of students with a foreign educational background may be influenced
by additional factors such as language skills, we only take into account students who
hold a German high school leaving certificate. In addition, we exclude students with a
high school leaving grade of 4.0, the worst grade still allowing a student to pass. This is
done as in our dataset a high school leaving grade of 4.0 was often found for students,
in particular for foreign students, who enrolled in fields of study without admission
restriction. This strongly suggests that the grade is sometimes used as a place holder
when the real grade seemed not to be important for the admission procedure. However,
we are confident that we have only deleted a very small number of students who actually
have a high school leaving grade of 4.0 by imposing this restriction.
In addition, students have to provide information about their home address, usually
their parents’ address, and their semester address, usually the place students live by
themselves. Since most students move to Göttingen when starting university, home
and semester address should differ. Nonetheless, for some students in our dataset the
two zip-codes are identical. As we make use of the parents’ address in our analysis it
is important that the correct zip-code is used. To deal with this problem, we look at
all students for whom the zip-code of their home and semester address are the same. If
both zip-codes belong to a place outside of Göttingen, it is very likely that this student
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is still living with her parents. If the zip-codes are identical and from Göttingen, it
might be that the student did not provide any information about her parents’ home
address. Therefore, we take a look at the administrative district the student went to
school in. If she graduated from a high school in Göttingen, we have no reason to doubt
that her parents also live there. On the other hand, if she went to school outside of
Göttingen, it is not entirely clear that the information about the home address really




Table 4.A.1: University level - Coefficients for Table 4.2
Graduation Graduation
-All Faculties- -Within Faculty-
Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school GPA 0.528*** 0.527*** 0.414*** 0.405***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016)
Male -0.014 -0.022
(0.025) (0.021)
Private health insurance 0.134*** 0.091***
(0.028) (0.024)
Purchasing power index 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant -1.359*** -1.513*** -1.076*** -1.142***
(0.048) (0.271) (0.079) (0.240)
States included No Yes No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.048 0.051 0.031 0.033
Log Likelihood -8120 -8093 -11368 -11338
Observations 12315 12315 16931 16931
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses; clustered by counties; *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Private health insurance 0.119***
(0.023)

































Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses;




Table 4.A.3.a: Graduation by faculties - Coefficients for Table 4.4.a
Graduation by Faculties
Theology Law Medicine Humanities Mathematics Physics Chemistry
High school GPA 0.539*** 0.663*** 0.714*** 0.479*** 0.889*** 0.717*** 0.820***
(0.115) (0.057) (0.076) (0.038) (0.083) (0.088) (0.089)
Male 0.310 0.019 0.048 -0.304*** 0.181 0.336* 0.121
(0.167) (0.084) (0.070) (0.047) (0.112) (0.150) (0.120)
Private health insurance 0.496** 0.048 0.204** 0.173*** 0.373** -0.044 0.032
(0.188) (0.078) (0.071) (0.048) (0.139) (0.145) (0.125)
Purchasing power index 0.006 -0.000 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 -0.001 0.002
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Constant -2.518** -1.900*** -1.496*** -1.848*** -2.571*** -2.438*** -2.742***
(0.953) (0.419) (0.406) (0.364) (0.623) (0.666) (0.551)
States included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.076 0.125 0.059 0.164 0.111 0.137
Log Likelihood -167 -774 -896 -2128 -367 -345 -378
Observations 284 1246 1481 3342 660 567 644
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses; clustered by county; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 4.A.3.b: Graduation by Faculties - Coefficients of Table 4.4.b
Graduation by Faculties
Geology/Geography Biology Forest Sciences Agriculture Economic Sciences Social Sciences
High school GPA 0.172 0.441*** 0.388*** 0.346*** 0.410*** 0.218***
(0.092) (0.053) (0.104) (0.068) (0.049) (0.048)
Male -0.325* -0.040 0.081 0.132 -0.057 -0.069
(0.151) (0.069) (0.123) (0.090) (0.053) (0.056)
Private health insurance 0.154 0.093 0.102 -0.098 0.168** 0.028
(0.145) (0.083) (0.097) (0.092) (0.055) (0.072)
Purchasing power index 0.010 -0.006 -0.000 -0.005 0.002 0.009***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -1.375 -0.472 -0.772 -0.031 -0.971** -1.589***
(0.715) (0.369) (0.546) (0.423) (0.374) (0.308)
States included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.047 0.043 0.024 0.032 0.019
Log Likelihood -360 -923 -425 -1004 -1819 -1198
Observations 542 1410 666 1546 2740 1778




“A is the Aim?”*
5.1 Introduction
Academic grades are said to reflect students’ achievement and thereby the effectiveness
of educational institutions and their accountability to potential employers. However, in
the past decades, confidence in the reliability of the grades has been badly shaken by
studies exposing the trend towards grade inflation. Several studies have shown that rise
in grades has become an issue in both secondary and tertiary education across many
countries, thereby stressing the need to provide explanations for the phenomenon of
grade inflation. Rojstaczer and Healy (2010) conducted a study of grading patterns
in more than 160 American colleges and universities and found a nationwide rise in
average grades of nearly a tenth of a point change per decade, with A being the most
commonly awarded grade at American colleges and universities.
This paper addresses this concern by focusing on the differences in grading poli-
cies between professors assigned to the same mandatory first-year course in Economics.
Firstly, the analysis reveals that there are huge differences in grading even within the
same course. Secondly, the effect of having a certain professor in the mandatory first-
year course on student’s later performance is highly significant and cannot be solely
explained by differences in professors’ grading. However, the sign of this effect is am-
biguous, and depends on the mathematical rigor of the course and the examination
style. Furthermore, the results demonstrate a highly significant effect of having the
same professor for many classes, although switching from a tough to an easy grader
seems to be the best strategy for improving grades. Our analysis shows that the ob-
tained effects are quite meaningful. All else being equal, having a certain professor in
Microeconomics I is associated with an improvement of the expected grade in a follow-
*See Danilowicz-Gösele (2016).
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on course by up to 1.385 grades. The overall result indicates that both grading policies
and learning outcomes vary between professors within the same course.
When talking about grade inflation, it is important to distinguish between awarding
higher grades per se and improvement in grades as a result of better performing stu-
dents who are learning more and/or being taught better. The difficulty with the latter
explanation lies in the fact that a growing number of educational researchers claim
that it is raining A’s in the education system without continuous evidence of increasing
academic performance.
Strong evidence that students are indeed doing worse today relative to a decade
ago is provided by researchers from the National Center for Education and Statistics
in 2015, who claim that SAT scores in critical reading, writing and math have dropped
each year within the analyzed period from 2004 till 2012 (Kena et al., 2015). Moreover,
according to the report published by the National Bureau of Economic Research of
the University of California, students decreased their class and studying time from 40
hours per week in 1961 to 27 hours per week in 2003 (Babcock and Marks, 2011). Since
concerns about grade inflation are not new, researchers have already offered many
explanations for the upward trend in grades. Some of these explanations focus on
changes in educational institutions including changes in enrollment patterns (Prather
and Kodras, 1979), curricula (Prather and Kodras, 1979) or grading policies (Birnbaum,
1977).
Although the teaching body is expected to individually regulate grading policies,
because of their effect on the reputation of the institutions they work for and students’
career chances, it is commonly known that unregulated institutions are very often chal-
lenged to maintain certain continuous standards. This is also the case for the colleges
and universities, which have troubles maintaining academic standards in the absence
of any regulation. Against this background, educational researchers found out that
teachers’ characteristics such as teaching quality (De Paola, 2009), teaching experience
(Rivkin et al., 2005; Clotfelter et al., 2007), gender (Neumark and Gardecki, 1998;
Bettinger and Long, 2005; Carrell et al., 2010) and age (Hong, 1984), have statistically
significant effects on students’ grades. However, there is less agreement on the influence
of the instructor rank (Sonner, 2000), part-time or full-time status or salary (Nelson and
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Lynch, 1984; Pressman, 2007; Hoffmann and Oreopoulos, 2009). In addition, there is
strong evidence that changes in the use of student evaluations (Krautmann and Sander,
1999; Stratton et al., 1994; Johnson, 2003; Eiszler, 2002) or the public availability of
median grades (Bar et al., 2009) may also influence the extent to which instructors
exaggerate students’ grades.
Other kinds of explanations draw attention to changes in students’ behavior includ-
ing students’ freedom in choosing departments, courses or certain professors. At many
universities, there is a visible trend towards learning that is more relevant to students’
interests and goals. Therefore, today’s students have much more freedom in designing
their study paths, being able to choose from a wide range of major/elective courses de-
pendent on their interest, abilities, difficulty level, instructor, work load or examination
structure. In some cases, they can even decide whether the grade from a taken class will
appear on their transcript of records or not. Thus, in order to improve the overall grade,
students may act strategically by taking advantage of the mentioned differences, which
will result in attending carefully-selected courses or in opting for non-visible grades.
The study of Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991) shows that students are significantly
more likely to enroll in a subsequent course of a department where they have already
received a relatively higher grade. Another finding of their study is that grades obtained
in low-grading departments are better predictors of students’ later performance than
grades received from grade-deflating departments. A similar finding is reported in a
study of Ost (2010), who found out that low grades in science classes can be used as a
predictor for students’ participation in subsequent science courses.
Given all this, it is not surprising that, in many countries, such as United States,
Canada, England, Scotland and Wales, online professor rating sites, such as “Rate
My Professors.com”, become so popular. In this case, students have the possibility to
rate their professors according to easiness, helpfulness, clarity, hotness and the rater’s
interest in the class, in order to help fellows to choose the appropriate classes and/or
professors. Some studies, such as Miles and Sparks (2013), examined the effect of
online professor ratings and found out, that such websites indeed have an influence on
students’ choices for selecting professors, however it is not very clear to what extent.
Although there is a vast amount of research on grade inflation, there is little at-
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tention to grading differences within higher education, especially within the same field
of study or within the same course. This paper contributes to this body of literature
by assessing the effect of grading and teaching differences from a mandatory first-year
course on students’ performance in follow-on courses at a German University. Even
though all professors assigned to the mandatory first-year course have a very similar
teaching and examination style, and students in most cases follow the curriculum, there
is no random placement of students into the classroom and thus we have to be aware of
students’ self-selection toward certain professors. For this reason, this paper proposes
an instrumental variable (IV) strategy by instrumenting student’s choice of a professor
through a random assignment of professors, on the semester basis, to the mandatory
first-year course. In this case, we follow the faculty’s recommendation to write the exam
in the second semester of studies. Therefore, taking the exam with a professor who was
assigned to the course in the student’s second semester will influence the student’s later
performance. On the contrary, the fact that a professor is assigned to the course in the
student’s second semester does not affect the student’s later achievements if a student
decides, against the faculty’s recommendation, to write her exam in an earlier or later
semester.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides a brief overview of the
institutional background. The data set, variables used and the empirical framework
are presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the results and Section 5.5 concludes
with summarizing the findings of the analysis.
5.2 Institutional Background
Since the aim of the paper is to study the differences in professors’ grading and its effect
on students’ performance in follow-on classes, this paper chooses one of the mandatory
first-year courses offered at the faculty of Economics, namely Microeconomics I. It
is an introductory undergraduate course that teaches the fundamentals of microeco-
nomics. The reasons for our choice are three-fold. Firstly, this course is mandatory
for all students enrolled at the faculty of economic sciences at Göttingen University,
thus providing us with extensive and diverse observations. Secondly, within the fac-
ulty of economic sciences, Microeconomics I is the course with the greatest number of
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professors assigned, thus indicating variation according to their characteristics such as
grading policy. Last but not least, since Microeconomics I is one of the first courses
economic students are required to take in their undergraduate programs, it also serves
as a prerequisite for many follow-on classes. Therefore, its accompanying effect of dif-
ferent grading policies, if existent, should be strong enough to be observed in students’
later achievements.
Based on the explicit information provided on students’ university records, we are
able to restrict our analysis to students enrolled at the faculty of economic sciences
who have participated in the Microeconomics I exam either once or multiple times but
always with the same professor. Although professors’ assignment to the Microeconomics
I course is to a greater extent random and thus not known in advance to the students,
we are still aware of the self-selection bias toward certain professors. The reason for
this is that, students are, to some extent, free to choose when they want to take this
course. The only restricting factor is the examination regulation, according to which
the credits for this course must be earned by the end of the student’s fifth semester.
For this reason, they can postpone taking the course to a later semester or even after
taking the class in their second semester they can still decide to drop-out of the exam.
In fact, it might be tempting for some students to postpone the Microeconomics I exam
until a professor, known for “easy grading”, will offer it.
In order to control for students’ potential self-selection bias, we follow the recom-
mendation of the Economics faculty. Hence, in our analysis we will distinguish between
students who followed faculty’s recommendation and students who postponed the exam
to a later date. In addition to this we could also think about other factors, such as
illness or other circumstances beyond students’ control, that lead to postponing the
exam.
The follow-on courses that we decided to look at are Microeconomics II and Public
Finance, the latter one combines the introductory and the advanced course which are
both taught by the same professor. Both courses aim to further deepen the study in
microeconomics, thus having Microeconomics I as a prerequisite. All examined courses
have a similar structure and consist of lecture and tutorials on a weekly basis. The
lectures are taught by one of the university professors, tutorials, however, are taught
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either by scientific assistants (Public Finance) or trained students who already passed
the respective course (Microeconomics I and II).
5.3 Data and Methodology
5.3.1 Dataset and Descriptives
Dataset
This paper employs a unique administrative data set of 2, 920 students enrolled at the
faculty of economic sciences of the Göttingen University who participated in the Mi-
croeconomics I exam between 2006 and 2011.22 The detailed and anonymized data
includes students’ characteristics such as high school leaving degree, gender, type of
health insurance or parental address, as well as students’ university records such as
chosen field of study, grades, examiners, attempts and examination dates.
Dependent Variables
Our outcome variables are students’ grades from three undergraduate courses offered
at the faculty of economic sciences, namely Microeconomics I, Microeconomics II and
Public Finance.
The data set is restricted to students who either took the exam in Microeconomics
I one time or multiple times but always with the same professor. In case of multiple
examination attempts, we will use the grade a student received on her first examination
attempt in this course, implying that every student in our data has only one grade in
Microeconomics I. For the two other courses, Microeconomics II and Public Finance,
we will use the best grade the student received in all her attempts. In order to make the
results internationally comparable, German grading scale, with 1.0 as the best possible
grade and 4.0 as the minimum passing grade, has been translated to the U.S. grading
scheme.
22Göttingen is a small city in Lower Saxony (Germany) where students account for 22% of the
city’s population (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009). According to the statistics of the University of
Göttingen, there are currently more than 4,300 students enrolled at the Faculty of Economic Sciences,
which amounts to around 15 percent of all students on campus.
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Independent Variables
Within the analyzed period from 2006 to 2011, five different professors were assigned to
teach the Microeconomics I course. To include these in our analysis, we create an indi-
cator variable for each professor, reflecting the student’s enrollment decision concerning
Microeconomics I. For example, if a student took her first Microeconomics I exam with
Professor 1, her indicator variable for this professor will equal one. Consequently, the
remaining four indicator variables (Professor 2; Professor 3; Professor 4; Professor 5)
will be zero.
Assuming that students can benefit from having the same professor in different
subjects, we include one further indicator variable Same Professor to capture the effect
of having the same professor in the two analyzed courses.
The high school grade point average (GPA) will be used as a control for students’
ability. GPA serves as a predictor of academic success believing that this measure cap-
tures more than just the students’ abilities or achievements but also certain behavioral
factors. Likewise course grades, high school GPA is converted to the U.S. grading scale.
In the analysis, we also account for students’ socio-economic background by using
the students’ health insurance type and the purchasing power index of her parents’ zip-
code area. The type of health insurance is suited as a proxy for students’ educational
and socio-economic background because of the organization of the German health care
insurance system, which is characterized by the dual system of public and private health
insurance. While almost everyone is eligible for public health insurance, the private
health insurance can be chosen only due to certain income criteria or employment
status.23. Since in most cases students are insured through their parents, their health
insurance status also provides information about their educational background.
Additionally, the purchasing power index within the zip-code area of the students’
home address serves as another compelling measure of students’ socio-economic back-
ground, considering that the German zip-code areas are fairly small and assuming that
there is some residential sorting due to income. It relates to the per-capita income of a
zip-code area with the average per-capita income of Germany, thus expressing the pur-
23In 2008 the number of people being privately insured (civil servants, self-employed or high earners)
with a university degree was almost three times as high as that within the total German population
(Finkenstädt and Keßler, 2012; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009)
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chasing power of a region. The index is normalized to 100, meaning that an area with
an index value of 110 has a purchasing power of greater than ten percent as compared
to the German average.
Furthermore, since there is a lack of agreement in educational research about gender
differences we include gender as a control variable in our analysis. Gender is measured
as a dichotomous variable coded as 1 for female and 0 for male.
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics in Table 5.1 show that the number of observations in the two
analyzed follow-on courses, Microeconomics II and Public Finance, does not equal our
sample size in Microeconomics I. This is due to the fact that study and examination reg-
ulations vary among degree programs at the faculty of economic sciences, meaning that
some courses are not necessarily required as part of undergraduate studies. For Microe-
conomics I, the mean-value for a sample of 2,920 students is 2.12. For Microeconomics
II, the mean-value for a sample of 1,255 students is 2.03 and thus only slightly lower
than the mean-value of Microeconomics I. The highest mean-value of 2.33 appeared for
a sample of 964 students in Public Finance.
Nearly half of the students in the sample took their Microeconomics I exam with
Professor 1, and one third of the students with Professor 5. Possible explanations for
these differences in the attendance rates include the fact, that these both professors
offered this course more often.
In our sample the mean-value of High School GPA is approximately 2.5 which is
higher, meaning better, than the mean of the grades obtained in Microeconomics I,
Microeconomics II and Public Finance, respectively. This can be explained by the fact
that a grade of 0.0, meaning failed, is not possible for the high school leaving certificate.
The share of female students in all courses is about 40 percent. The purchasing power
index is slightly lower for students in the Public Finance class and almost the same
for students in Microeconomics I and in Microeconomics II. Microeconomics I has the
lowest share of students with a private health insurance.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Grade in Microeconomics I 2920.00 2.12 1.11 0.00 4.00
High School GPA 2920.00 2.46 0.55 1.20 4.00
Female 2920.00 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Private Health Insurance 2920.00 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Purchasing Power Index 2920.00 99.09 11.76 70.16 258.82
Prof. 1 Dummy 2920.00 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00
Prof. 2 Dummy 2920.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Prof. 3 Dummy 2920.00 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Prof. 4 Dummy 2920.00 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Prof. 5 Dummy 2920.00 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Easy Graders Dummy 2920.00 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Tough Graders Dummy 2920.00 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Grade in Microeconomics II 1255.00 2.03 1.13 0.00 4.00
High School GPA 1255.00 2.46 0.58 1.20 4.00
Female 1255.00 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Private Health Insurance 1255.00 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Purchasing Power Index 1255.00 99.10 11.71 70.16 186.99
Prof. 1 Dummy 1255.00 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00
Prof. 2 Dummy 1255.00 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00
Prof. 3 Dummy 1255.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Prof. 4 Dummy 1255.00 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Prof. 5 Dummy 1255.00 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Easy Graders Dummy 1255.00 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Tough Graders Dummy 1255.00 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Grade in Public Finance 964.00 2.23 1.07 0.00 4.00
High School GPA 964.00 2.50 0.57 1.20 4.00
Female 964.00 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Private Health Insurance 964.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Purchasing Power Index 964.00 98.93 11.54 70.16 169.56
Prof. 1 Dummy 964.00 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Prof. 2 Dummy 964.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Prof. 3 Dummy 964.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Prof. 4 Dummy 964.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Prof. 5 Dummy 964.00 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Easy Graders Dummy 964.00 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Tough Graders Dummy 964.00 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Grades transformed to 1-4 Scale, with 4 being the best grade and 1 being the worst grade




In fact, we do not have course placement in the sense of a random assignment, meaning
that the students could up to some extent freely decide on the timing of their exams
and hence choose professors they want to write the exams with. Thus, although we
cannot observe any assignment pattern, students’ long-term expectations about who
will teach Microeconomics I in following semesters should not be underestimated. In
order to control for the potential self-selection bias of the students, we will follow the
faculty’s recommendation to take the Microeconomics I exam in the second semester
of undergraduate studies.
In our analysis, we first examine the grading policy of the five professors assigned
to Microeconomics I. Since we first want to analyze how does tough or easy grading
from a fundamental undergraduate course correspond to students’ later university per-
formance, we divide the sample of professors in two groups (Tough Graders vs. Easy
Graders) according to their grading standards - professors are classified by whether
their mean grade is above or below the sample average. To examine the effect of hav-
ing a Tough Grader/Easy Grader in Microeconomics I on the grade obtained in the
respective follow-on class, ordinary least square (OLS) regressions are applied. Thus,
in the baseline empirical model, student’s performance can be described using a linear
relationship with student’s grade from a single class as the dependent variable and a
vector of independent variables. The baseline model is then given by
yic = β0 + β1GPAi + β2Si + β3Pi + εi (5.1)
where yic is the grade for student i in course c; GPAi is the high school GPA of student
i; Si is a vector of individual characteristics of i such as gender and socio-economic
background, Pi is the dummy variable either for the professor the student i wrote her
Microeconomics I exam with or for the group (Tough Graders/Easy Graders) her profes-
sor belongs to; εi is an error term. In all regressions, robust standard errors are clustered
by semester. However, since the number of clusters is less than 30, it is possible that the
estimated standard errors are biased downward. Therefore, we follow (Cameron et al.,
2008) and report the wild bootstrap p-values below the coefficient estimates in brackets.
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Instrumental Variables Regression (IV)
Estimates of β3, the coefficient of professor’s dummy variable from Microeconomics I
exam, may be biased under OLS regressions due to the potential self-selection bias of
students toward certain professors. For instance, if all weak students chose to write the
Microeconomics I exam with an Easy Grader, the professor’s effect in Microeconomics
II would be much more negative. For this reason we treat the professor’s dummy Pi
as an endogenous regressor, assuming that Pi and εi are somehow correlated. Since
we are treating Pi as endogenous, we need one or more additional variables that are
correlated with Pi but not correlated with εi. When analyzing grades obtained in the
Microeconomics II and the Public Finance exam, we group up professors according to
their grading standards, so that Pi from the baseline model will be then replaced by
P (tough)i representing the Tough Graders.
To account for the potential self-selection bias, we propose standard IV approach.
Implementing the IV approach requires a two stage least squares estimation (2SLS) to
be performed. This approach starts with the first stage of analysis, which is necessary
given that the potential self-selection of students toward certain professors may affect
both independent and dependent variables. In the first stage P (tough)i becomes the
dependent variable and the independent variables include all control variables from
the second stage as well as the instrumental variable. Addressing the faculty’s rec-
ommendation to write the Microeconomics I exam in the second semester, we create
an instrumental variable, that is equal to one if a student took the Microeconomics I
exam with a professor who was supposed to offer this course in her second semester of
studies, and equal to zero otherwise. Therefore, taking the exam with a professor who
was assigned to the course in the student’s second semester will influence the student’s
later performance. On the contrary, the fact that a professor is assigned to the course
in the student’s second semester does not affect the student’s later achievements if a
student decides, against the faculty’s recommendation, to write her exam in an ear-
lier or later semester. The instrument should not have any influence on the outcome
variable. Moreover, these excluded exogenous variables must not influence grade yic
directly, otherwise they should be included in the Equation 5.1. Since we have five dif-
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ferent professors assigned to the Microeconomics I exam, we will have five instrumental
variables, one for each professor. Therefore, the endogenous regressor Tough Graders
will be instrumented by three (Professor 1; Professor 2 and Professor 3) additional
exogenous variables.
The first stage equation looks as follows:
P (tough)i = πo+π1GPAi+π2Si+π3Professor1i+π2Professor2i+π3Professor3i+εi
(5.2)
The second stage implements the Equation 5.1, in which the dependent variable
is regressed on the predicted values from the first stage regression plus the control
variables. It is assumed that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with any
omitted variables, thus removing the bias in the relationship between student’s grade in
a course and student’s choice of the professor to write the exam with. In the following we
will apply the above instrumental approach to the subsamples of students who obtained,
besides the grade from the Microeconomics I, at least one grade in the Microeconomics
II and/or in the Public Finance exam.
An important condition to obtain consistent estimation is that the instruments are
not weak. This can be tested with the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic, which
is a robust analog to the Cragg Donald statistic and thus superior in the presence of
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation or clustering (Baum et al., 2007). It is an F statistic
for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage regression, which tests
whether the instruments jointly explain a sufficient amount of the variation in the
endogenous regressor. If the instruments are weak the standard errors can become
considerably larger and the t statistics considerably smaller than those from OLS,
indicating the loss of precision.
The other general specification is the Hansen test that implements a test of overiden-
tifying restrictions and is robust to heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis of this test
is that overidentifying restrictions are valid (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Therefore




Having a certain professor in the Microeconomics I exam may be associated with a
different grading and teaching style, which in turn will influence students’ performance
in follow-on courses. On the one hand, it is likely that students who took their Microe-
conomics I exam with a Tough Grader, and thus learned more, will perform better in
the Microeconomics II exam. This would suggest that besides different grading policies,
we also find significant differences in learning outcomes. On the other hand, it may
also be that they learned the same as they would with an Easy Grader and just got a
worse grade, which simply refers to differences in grading policies.
5.4.1 Microeconomics I
By looking at students’ performance in Microeconomics I, we estimate the effect of
having a certain professor on the grade obtained from the first attempt in the Microe-
conomics I exam. This effect may arise from a number of professors’ characteristics, for
instance grading policy, teaching or examination style, or combination of those. For this
course, our benchmark student is male, holds a public health insurance and is average
with regard to all continuous variables.
The OLS estimation results can be found in Table 5.2. According to the results, the
choice of a professor in Microeconomics I has a significant impact on the grade achieved
in this subject. Hence, taking Microeconomics I exam with Professor 1, Professor 2 or
Professor 3 results in lower grades than writing the exam with Professor 5 (baseline).
Thus, professors seem to vary considerably in their grading standards, even within
a single course. This finding raises further questions whether the observed grading
differences have a significant influence on students’ later achievements.
Estimating the effect of professors’ grading standards on students’ later achieve-
ments assumes that these standards are relatively consistent over time, that they are
not affected by the composition of students attending the course. To analyze this, we
divided the sample of professors into two groups according to their grading standards
each semester and analyzed if their position changes over time. The first group, Tough
Graders, consists of Professor 1, Professor 2 and Professor 3, and the second group,
Easy Graders, of Professor 4 and Professor 5. We found that there was no movement
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between those groups, which led us, since we are not primarily interested in professors’
individual characteristics, to use this classification for our subsequent analysis. It is
not surprising that, when including these two groups as control variables, one finds a
highly significant and negative effect of the Tough Graders on students’ obtained grade
in Microeconomics I.
In addition, we find the expected highly significant and positive effect of the high
school leaving grade as shown in Table 5.2. The higher the high school leaving grade,
the better the grade the student obtains in Microeconomics I exam. Although the
size of the coefficient may appear to be somewhat large, it provides an indication that
this course is based on skills and methods already used in high school. For instance,
Mathematics serves as a prerequisite for all analyzed courses and is generally counted
more heavily in the calculation of the GPA. This result is consistent with the findings
of a large body of existing research (see e.g. Cyrenne and Chan, 2012; Girves and
Wemmerus, 1988). Other controls are of lesser importance. The gender as well as
the socio-economic variables, private health insurance and the purchasing power index
of parents’ zip-code area, do not show a significant effect in any of the regressions
based on conventional hypothesis tests that are presented in Table 5.2. However, the
purchasing power index is significant at the 5 percent level based on wild bootstrap
p-values. These overall findings are in line with Danilowicz-Gösele et al. (2014) who
found that socio-economic factors are, if at all, poor indicators of students’ university
performance.
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Table 5.2: OLS regression estimates for Microeconomics I
Dependent variable: Grade in Microeconomics I
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Private Health Insurance 0.0631 0.0604
(0.038) (0.037)
[0.160] [0.160]
Purchasing Power Index 0.00243 0.00258
(0.001) (0.001)
[0.040] [0.040]
Course Assignment of Prof. 1 - 0.639*** -0.732***
(0.088) (0.089)
[0.040] [0.040]
Course Assignment of Prof. 2 -0.622** -0.728***
(0.219) (0.180)
[0.200] [0.080]
Course Assignment of Prof. 3 -0.564*** -0.611***
(0.118) (0.128)
[0.040] [0.040]
Course Assignment of Prof. 4 -0.226 -0.245
(0.179) (0.178)
[0.200] [0.200]
Tough Graders -0.568*** -0.653***
(0.072) (0.068)
[0.040] [0.040]
Constant 2.512*** 2.452*** 0.581*** 0.508**
(0.068) (0.047) (0.178) (0.203)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R2 0.0673 0.0637 0.193 0.189
Observations 2920 2920 2920 2920
Cluster 18 18 18 18
F stat. 28 62 278 431
Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Standard errors
clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets below each coefficient estimate.
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5.4.2 Microeconomics II
Knowing that there are relatively big differences in grading between Tough Graders and
Easy Graders in Microeconomics I, we want to analyze whether the grades obtained
in this fundamental course correspond to students’ performance in subsequent courses.
Did the students who obtained better grades in Microeconomics I in fact learn more?
Or do some of the grades just mirror the grade inflation trend?
As already mentioned before, today’s students very often have the possibility to
decide on courses or even professors within one single course. Hence, the endogenous
variables Tough Graders will be instrumented by the respective exogenous variables,
namely the assignment of professors to the Microeconomics I course. Our instrumental
variables fulfill the two usual conditions: (1) they are correlated with the endogenous
variable and (2) do not affect students’ performance in subsequent courses indepen-
dently.
Table 5.3 presents the OLS estimation results and Tables 5.4 and 5.5 the two-
stage least squares estimates using the assignment-based instrument for professors.
First stage F-statistic and Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic jointly confirm that
the instrument is not weak. With the Hansen test, denoted as Hansen’s J statistic,
the validity of overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected in specification 1 at the
five percent level and in specifications 2 and 3, when controlling for having the same
professor in both courses, at the ten percent level.
There is a strong ex ante expectation that the better the grade in Microeconomics
I, the better the performance in Microeconomics II. Surprisingly, Table 5.4 shows sig-
nificant and positive effect of Tough Graders on students’ grade in Microeconomics
II in all specifications. The size of the effect depends on whether or not the control
variable for having the same professor in both analyzed courses is included. In the
first specification, having a Tough Grader in Microeconomics I is associated with an
improvement of the expected grade in Microeconomics II exam by 0.453 grades. This
effect becomes less important when controlling for the effect of the Same Professor. At
first view, this result appears to be straightforward: students profit from the familiar
teaching and examination style when taking several courses with the same instructor.
However, this effect becomes less obvious when distinguishing between both professors’
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groups. According to the estimation results from specification 3, a student who took
both Microeconomics exams with the same Tough Grader is worse off than a student
who wrote both exams with a Tough Grader but not the same one. However, most dis-
advantaged are students who took both Microeconomics exams with an Easy Grader.
Best off are students who had a Tough Grader in Microeconomics I and an Easy Grader
in Microeconomics II. These results can partly be explained by the the fact that the
Tough Graders from Microeconomics II are exactly the same ones we had in Microe-
conomics I. Still, there seem to be a significant difference between the both professors
assigned to Tough Graders due to some unobservable characteristics.
From the above results, we conclude that, other things being equal, students who
wrote their Microeconomics I exam with one of the Tough Graders are performing better
in Microeconomics II exam. Hence, having a Tough Grader in the first-year course is
positively related to the student’s performance in follow-on courses. Therefore, grades
obtained in classes with low-grading professors seem to be better predictors of students’
later achievements than grades received from grade-deflating professors. These result
are in line with the findings of Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991) and Ost (2010) and
also confirm our speculation on the grade inflation within Microeconomics I course.
Furthermore, we find the expected highly significant and positive effect of the high
school leaving degree on students’ performance in Microeconomics II exam. An im-
provement of the high school GPA by one full grade is associated with an improvement
of the expected grade in Microeconomics II by slightly more than 0.6 grades, which is
only slightly lower than for Microeconomics I. This comparison indicates that the Mi-
croeconomics II course is based on concepts and skills that go somewhat beyond the high
school level. In addition, we now find a significant negative effect for female, which is
consistent with the existing literature on gender gap in Mathematics (Ellison and Swan-
son, 2010; Xie and Shauman, 2003). In our case, this result can be explained by the
composition of students within a single course. The Microeconomics I course is manda-
tory for all students enrolled at the faculty of economic sciences. The Microeconomics II
course, on the contrary, only to the students majoring in Economics. Furthermore, our
data reveals that due to some unobserved characteristics female business students per-
form better in Mathematics than their female colleagues from Economics. These both
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Table 5.3: Student performance in Microeconomics II (OLS)
Grade in Microeconomics II
(1) (2) (3)
High School GPA 0.656*** 0.635*** 0.653***
(0.067) (0.065) (0.066)
Female -0.218** -0.215*** -0.210***
(0.076) (0.072) (0.070)
Private Health Insurance 0.0628 0.0448 0.0437
(0.086) (0.084) (0.079)
Purchasing Power Index 0.00394* 0.00403* 0.00432**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)




Same Professor - Easy Grader 0.898***
(0.184)
Same Professor - Tough Grader -0.0208
(0.123)
Constant 0.0909 -0.198 -0.548*
(0.253) (0.292) (0.311)
Observations 1230 1230 1230
Cluster 17 17 17
Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below
each coefficient estimate.
insights may explain the significant negative effect for female in the Microeconomics II
exam. However, this conclusion should be qualified only to some extent, because the
wild bootstrap p-value for female is only significant in the last specification.
Our socio-economic variables, students’ health insurance type and the purchasing
power index of her parents’ zip-code area, are of lesser importance. This results are in
line with the findings of Danilowicz-Gösele et al. (2014) implying that socio-economic
factors do not determine students’ academic achievements, even if they are significantly
associated with it.
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Table 5.4: Student performance in Microeconomics II (IV) (second stage)
Second stage
Grade in Microeconomics II
(1) (2) (3)
High School GPA 0.614*** 0.604*** 0.644***
(0.061) (0.063) (0.059)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Female -0.172* -0.180** -0.159*
(0.088) (0.083) (0.094)
[0.160] [0.200] [0.200]
Private Health Insurance 0.0570 0.0412 0.037
(0.090) (0.086) (0.085)
[0.560] [0.640] [0.720]
Purchasing Power Index 0.00221 0.00274* 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[0.280] [0.120] [0.120]
Micro I: Tough Grader 0.453*** 0.311** 1.715***
(0.114) (0.145) (0.589)
[0.000] [0.080] [0.000]






Same Professor - Tough Grader -0.657*
(0.357)
[0.040]
Constant 0.132 -0.155 -0.831**
(0.243) (0.278) (0.370)
[0.440] [0.400] [0.480]
Observations 1230 1230 1230
Cluster 17 17 17
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat 230.162 172.419 174.991
Hansens J statistic 4.619 2.135 1.642
Hansen p-value 0.099 0.344 0.440
Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses be-
low each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets
below each coefficient estimate.
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High School GPA 0.0829*** 0.0819*** 0.006
(0.026) (0.025) (0.018)
[0.040] [0.040] [0.720]
Female -0.0881** -0.0876** -0.038*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.018)
[0.120] [0.120] [0.120]
Private Health Insurance 0.00924 0.00893 0.000
(0.025) (0.025) (0.016)
[0.480] [0.520] [0.800]
Purchasing Power Index 0.00356*** 0.00357*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.160]
Course Assignment of Prof. 1 0.0881 0.0784 0.037
(0.086) (0.085) (0.053)
[0.520] [0.600] [0.560]
Course Assignment of Prof. 2 0.612*** 0.605*** 0.225***
(0.046) (0.048) (0.030)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Course Assignment of Prof. 3 0.643*** 0.627*** 0.060
(0.047) (0.054) (0.055)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.240]






Same Professor - Tough Grader 0.601***
(0.094)
[0.000]
Constant -0.150 -0.166* 0.226**
(0.095) (0.093) (0.088)
[0.200] [0.160] [0.880]
Observations 1230 1230 1230
Cluster 17 17 17
F first-stage 175 199 2788
Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses be-
low each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets
below each coefficient estimate.
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5.4.3 Public Finance
The second subsequent course we analyze is the Public Finance course. The OLS
estimation results can be found in Table 5.6. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 report two-stage
least squares estimates for our outcome variable across two different specifications.
Instrumentation is strong, as indicated by the first stage F-statistic and Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F-statistic. Hansen’s J statistic is far from rejection of its null, implying
the validity of overidentifying restrictions.
Here again, we have a strong ex ante expectation that the grade obtained in Microe-
conomics I can be used as a predictor for student’s performance in the Public Finance
class. In the first specification, where we do not control for the effect of having the
same professor in both analyzed courses, we find a highly significant but, surprisingly,
negative effect of the Tough Graders. This conclusion has to be qualified to some extent,
since the wild bootstrap p-value for the Tough Graders is insignificant. This negative
effect becomes smaller once the control variable for having the same professor in both
courses is included.
Both coefficients, Tough Graders and Same Professor are highly significant in the
last specification, both based on conventional and wild bootstrap hypothesis tests. In
this case, the interpretation is a little bit different than in the case of Microeconomics
II, since there is only one professor assigned to teach this course. In order to understand
the obtained results, we need to take into account that the professor assigned to teach
the Public Finance course is the one who gives the worst grades in Microeconomics I and
thus a Tough Grader. Hence, the students who wrote their both exams, Microeconomics
I and Public Finance, with the same professor are slightly better of than those students
who took their Microeconomics I exam with one of the Easy Graders.
In contrast to the results found for Microeconomics II, the worst off are now stu-
dents who have their Microeconomics I grade from one of the other two Tough Graders.
A reason for the partly inconsistent results may be that, although both courses are
strongly related to Microeconomics I, the Public Finance course is less mathematical
and has a different examination style than Microeconomics II. In Microeconomics I and
Microeconomics II students complete exam problems that are either similar to the mul-
tiple choice question type (true/false) or graded on the basis of the final result (fill-ins).
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However, exam problems in Public Finance include essay questions and calculations
which gives professors more freedom in grading their students. For this reasons, we did
not expect to find such a strong effect of having the same professor in both courses.
Table 5.6: Student performance in Public Finance (OLS)
Grade in Public Finance
(1) (2)




Private Health Insurance 0.251*** 0.273***
(0.057) (0.057)
Purchasing Power Index 0.00330 0.00287
(0.003) (0.003)








Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below
each coefficient estimate.
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Table 5.7: Student performance in Public Finance (IV) (second stage)
Second stage
Grade in Public Finance
(1) (2)






Private Health Insurance 0.271*** 0.274***
(0.070) (0.055)
[0.000] [0.000]
Purchasing Power Index 0.00645** 0.00290
(0.003) (0.002)
[0.080] [0.120]











Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat 208.172 3468.381
Hansens J statistic 2.365 2.652
Hansen p-value 0.306 0.266
Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses be-
low each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets
below each coefficient estimate.
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Private Health Insurance 0.0135 0.0291
(0.037) (0.020)
[0.840] [0.120]
Purchasing Power Index 0.00446*** 0.00132*
(0.001) (0.001)
[0.000] [0.120]
Course Assignment of Prof. 1 0.109 0.0139
(0.104) (0.019)
[0.280] [0.440]
Course Assignment of Prof. 2 0.659*** 0.925***
(0.047) (0.042)
[0.000] [0.000]











F first- stage 158 20274
Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses be-
low each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets
below each coefficient estimate.
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This finding suggests that there are differences in professors’ characteristics, not
only between the Easy Graders and the Tough Graders, but also within those groups.
In order to analyze this, we create two sub-samples: the first one includes students who
wrote their Microeconomics I exam either with the professor who gives the worst grades
(Professor 1) or with the professor who gives the best grades (Professor 5). The second
sub-sample consists of students who took their Microeconomics I exam again with the
toughest grader (Professor 1) or with the second toughest grader (Professor 2). The
results of estimating the effect of a single professor on the grade in Public Finance
exam can be found in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. The baseline category is now represented by
Professor 1. For both professors, Professor 2 and Professor 5, we find highly significant
and negative effect on student’s performance in Public Finance. According to this result,
having a tough professor in Microeconomics I does not always positively affect student’s
later performance in follow-on courses. Here, a student who took her Microeconomics I
exam with a professor who “gives out” grades is better off than a student with the second
toughest grader. On the one hand, it looks like, some of the Tough Graders teach better
and demand higher performance from their students, others just give lower grades.
On the other hand, Easy Graders do not always “only” inflate grades. Furthermore,
looking at some other follow-on courses suggests that students benefit from having an
Easy Grader in less theoretical courses where mathematical skills are not that essential
and examinations thus require less calculations.
In addition, we find the expected highly significant and positive effect of the high
school leaving degree on students’ grade in Public Finance exam. Since the Public
Finance course is a less mathematical one, we do not find a significant effect for female,
which is again consistent with our previous argumentation about prevalent gender gap
in mathematics. The effect of student’s health insurance type is now highly significant
and positive, which can be explained by the differences in students composition between
Microeconomics and Public Finance. Microeconomics courses are mandatory for many
students enrolled at the faculty of economic sciences. Public Finance, on the contrary,
is completed mostly by the students from economics, who in contrast to their business
colleagues, are less known for being fast climbers which in turn can relate to their
wealthy family status. A good socio-economic background is often related to the level
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of educational attainment of the parents. In the case of the Public Finance course
students from educated families can benefit from discussions and dialogue at home.
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Table 5.9: Student performance in Public Finance (IV) - Comparison (second stage)
Second stage
Grade in Public Finance
Professor 5 Professor 2






Private Health Insurance 0.291*** 0.385***
(0.072) (0.097)
[0.000] [0.000]
Purchasing Power Index 0.00260 0.00119
(0.003) (0.003)
[0.520] [0.840]
Micro I: Professor 5 -0.396***
(0.147)
[0.040]








Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat 69.702 206.523
Hansens J statistic 0.000 0.000
Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses be-
low each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets
below each coefficient estimate.
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Table 5.10: Student performance in Public Finance (IV) - Comparison (first stage)
First Stage
Professor 5 Professor 2






Private Health Insurance -0.0199 0.0526
(0.051) (0.039)
[0.680] [0.280]
Purchasing Power Index -0.00442*** 0.00203
(0.001) (0.001)
[0.040] [0.200]
Course Assignment of Prof. 5 0.329***
(0.394)
[0.000]








F first- stage 26 747
Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses be-
low each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets
below each coefficient estimate.
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5.5 Discussion
In recent years a great number of studies on higher education have emphasized fac-
tors that might influence students’ performance. While most of those studies focus on
students’ characteristics such as previous academic performance, age or socio-economic
status, less attention has been paid to the impact of professors’ characteristics or pro-
fessors’ grading.
Therefore in this paper, we analyze the impact of professors’ characteristics on
students’ achievement using data from almost 3,000 students from Göttingen University.
By looking at three courses at the Faculty of Economic Sciences, we first capture the
professor’s effect from the mandatory first-year course (Microeconomics I) and then
analyze its effect on student’s performance in follow-on courses (Microeconomics II and
Public Finance). Two main results emerge from our analysis. Firstly, we find that
it matters, for student’s later university performance in micro-related courses, which
professor was teaching and giving the Microeconomics I exam. Our results suggest
that students can benefit from having a tough or an easy grader in a fundamental
course, with the effects depending on the student’s prior academic performance and
design of the follow-on course, in particular the mathematical content of the course
and the resulting examination form. Secondly, we show that the effect of having the
same professor in Microeconomics I and in one of the two analyzed follow-on courses
is significant and highly relevant. Thus, students benefit much more from the familiar
teaching practices and the familiar examination style. In some cases, this positive effect
can even compensate or partially compensate for the negative professor’s effect from
Microeconomics I course.
From the consideration of the above results two questions arise: How can we explain
the arising differences in grading? and Do the Tough Graders indeed prepare students
for more rigorous mathematical and analytical standards by teaching something differ-
ent than their easy grading colleagues? In order to answer the first question, we should
consider if there are, besides the grading, other substantial differences between both
professor’s groups included in our analysis. When looking at the groups individually,
professors assigned to the Easy Graders are of higher age, have been employed longer
at a university and do less research than their younger colleagues. Together, our results
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and these facts lead us to hypothesize that professor’s age and teaching experience may
be, above certain threshold, positively associated with students’ grades. Older profes-
sors very often exude grandfather’s mildness and thus have more understanding for the
students. Another explanation for this result may stem from the fact that the longer a
professor was teaching the same subject, the easier he is to predict.
Furthermore, we can think about other factors, besides individual characteristics of
the teaching body, that potentially affect the grades and may differ between professors.
One of them is the class size. Since all professors structure the course in the same
way, offering lecture and tutorials on a weekly basis should not be an issue. Also the
credentials of the faculty teaching team should not determine our results, since we do
not observe striking differences in education level between the assigned professors and
their assistants. In addition, all professors included in our data set have very similar
status, implying that none of them are in a position of having to earn good evaluations
in order to be able to keep their job. Nonetheless, some of the professors may generally
tend to keep the students happy by giving them good, possibly inflated, grades. In
particular, those professors, who are close to retire, are less stringent since they want
to leave a good impression.
From the students’ point of view, the benefit of having an Easy Grader or a Tough
Grader in Microeconomics I depends to a great extent on the student’s course choices
and her timing. If grades were the only aim, students may act strategically by taking
advantage of the mentioned differences, which will result in postponing the exams until
the desired professor is offering the class or in attending only carefully-selected courses.
Our analysis shows that the obtained effects are quite meaningful. All else being equal,
having a certain professor in Microeconomics I is associated with an improvement of
the expected grade in a follow-on course by up to 1.385 grades. Therefore, making
smart strategic choices about study pathways may lead to a considerable improvement
of the final grade.
From the above results we conclude that there is much variability in grading not
only between universities or faculties, but also from one professor to the next and be-
tween courses within a field. The increasing diversity especially within higher education
system is valuable but comes at the expense of transparency in grading policies. Al-
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though grades are used to motivate students and to report the quality of student’s
performance for employers, researchers and politicians consistently raise arguments in
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